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DRAWING LINES IN THE DISAPPEARING SAND: A 
RE-EVALUATION OF SHORELINE RIGHTS AND 
REGIMES A QUARTER CENTURY AFTER  
BELL V. TOWN OF WELLS 
Michael P. Dixon* 
“The ‘control of nature’ is a phrase conceived in arrogance, 
born of the  Neanderthal age of . . . philosophy, when it was 
supposed that nature exists for the convenience of man.” 
- Rachel Carson, Silent Spring 
INTRODUCTION 
Humankind has long tried in vain to exert its will over natural 
phenomena that remain beyond its control.  There are countless forces of 
nature that persistently and consistently foil these attempts, but few are 
as bedeviling as those of the sea.  While it is now virtually undisputed 
that the collective conduct of humankind in recent decades has had a 
significant impact on the oceans, only a fool would be so bold as to claim 
any sort of dominion over them.   
And yet, at the seashore, society’s affinity for drawing lines, building 
fences, conveying titles, and generally imposing legal regimes continues 
to run up against the prevailing powers of the sea.  As a result, countless 
legal riddles arise at the water’s edge, where over 50 percent of the 
American population now lives,1 where many make their living and 
derive their sustenance, and where still more flock for days of frolic.  
The attempted solutions to these riddles are as various and numerous as 
the issues and, more often than not, courts, legislatures, agencies, and 
municipalities at multiple levels throw a combination of doctrines, 
                                            
 * J.D., University of Maine School of Law, Class of 2011.   
 1. Over Half of the American Population Lives Within 50 Miles of the Coast, NAT’L 
OCEAN SERVICE, http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/population.html (last updated Apr. 
19, 2011) [hereinafter NOAA FACTS]. 
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statutes, regulations, and ordinances at any given dispute.2  But the seas, 
storms, and sands have yet to yield to even these weighty efforts to 
impose order.3 
Over twenty years ago, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court (locally 
known as the Law Court) disregarded the realities recognized in the 
overwhelming majority of states and reasserted one of the more 
antiquated legal rationales on the books to circumscribe a starkly limited 
public trust in the foreshore.  In so holding, the Law Court also struck 
down the state legislature’s declaration of a more expansive public trust 
and granted preeminence to the claims of private beachfront landowners.4  
In the years following what are now commonly known as the Moody 
Beach Cases,5 commentators upset by both the outcome and the 
reasoning, which was largely grounded in a colonial ordinance over 300 
                                            
2. In addition to the many rules of common law, legislative bodies at both the 
federal and state levels have enacted countless statutes and created innumerable 
administrative bodies to address issues at or near the shoreline.  See, e.g., Coastal Zone 
Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (2006); the Public Trust in Intertidal Land 
Act, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 571-573 (2011).  Examples of parallel 
administrative bodies include the NOAA Office of Coastal Resource Management and 
the Maine Coastal Program. And more than one state has included coastal provisions in 
its Constitution.  See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. X, § 11; HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 1.  Many of 
these authorities and agencies have overlapping and often contradictory scope and 
enforcement powers, and so must be reconciled with one another, not to mention with the 
ancient common law doctrines.  For example, at the state level alone in Maine, there are 
at least nine state statutes that impact the shoreline zone.  MARINE LAW INST., MAINE 
STATE PLANNING OFFICE & MAINE GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, ANTICIPATORY PLANNING FOR 
SEA LEVEL RISE ALONG THE COAST OF MAINE A-1 (1994), available at 
http://epa.gov/climatechange/effects/downloads/maine_a.pdf [hereinafter MAINE 
ANTICIPATORY PLANNING] (identifying the state’s Natural Resource Protection Act and 
Sand Dunes Regulations; the Coastal Management Policies Act; the Growth Management 
Act; the Shoreland Zoning Act; the Site Location of Development Act; the Subdivision 
Law; the State Floodplain Management Program; the Submerged Lands Act; and the 
Coastal Barrier Resources System). 
 3. “To know the beaches is to know the beaches are moving.”  WALLACE KAUFMAN 
& ORRIN H. PILKEY, JR., THE BEACHES ARE MOVING: THE DROWNING OF AMERICA’S 
SHORELINE 13 (1983).  “We ignore this when we build motels, pavilions, boardwalks, and 
even whole towns on the edge of the ocean.  In our business hats we do not recognize any 
real estate as movable.  Corners are staked, lines drawn, and neat rectangular lots are 
recorded in courthouses as if they would be true forever.”  Id.  “Beaches are not stable, 
but they are in dynamic equilibrium.”  Id. at 15 (emphasis omitted) 
 4. Bell v. Town of Wells (Bell II), 557 A.2d 168, 178-179 (Me. 1989). 
 5. Bell v. Town of Wells (Bell I), 510 A.2d 509 (Me. 1986); Bell II, 557 A.2d 168. 
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years old, have flooded the pages of this journal and others with critique.  
Just over ten years ago, in Eaton v. Town of Wells,6 a case that bore both 
geographical and legal resemblance to the questions presented in the 
Moody Beach Cases, Justice Saufley, now the Chief Justice of the Law 
Court, called for their overturn.7  Thus far, however, none of these 
arguments has crested the judicial seawall, and the legislature has not 
returned directly to such turbulent waters since. 
Meanwhile, those two decades have also brought substantial changes 
in both the seascape and the legal landscape that call for yet another 
reassessment of how best to confront those issues that arise along with 
tides, wind, waves, and storm surge.  Part I of this Comment will explore 
the history and development of both civil and common law frameworks 
of rights and privileges at the coastline.  In Part II, this Comment will 
outline the situation that gave rise to the controversial decision of the 
Law Court, the arguments of the majority of the court, the ensuing 
dissent and critique, and an independent analysis.  With this foundation 
laid, the third and fourth parts of this Comment will examine recent 
trends and developments that call for a more effective approach to the 
shoreline realities unacknowledged by the majority of the Law Court in 
1989.  In Part III, this Comment will explore four recent case studies in 
which these legal frameworks were applied very differently in other 
American jurisdictions than in Maine.  Part IV will document the 
increasing challenges of climate change and the futility of coastal 
engineering.  Finally, this Comment will synthesize the implications of 
these factors and propose that these previously unknown or overlooked 
scientific, theoretical, and legal grounds call more loudly than ever for a 
more sustainable legal approach at the sea’s dynamic edge.   
I.  DOCTRINES AND LEGAL FRAMEWORKS 
A.  Overview 
For better or worse, with some apparent success and some obvious 
failure, humankind has long tried to exert control over the environment.  
More often than not, at least in the Western canon, man is pitted against 
the forces of nature, and nature against man.  Having largely secured 
basic shelter and a steady supply of food, Western society has moved on  
to devote tremendous manpower and financial resources to tame the 
                                            
 6. 760 A.2d 232 (Me. 2000). 
 7. Id. at 248 (Saufley, J., concurring).   
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courses of rivers,8 seed the clouds for rain, drill into the ocean floor,9 and 
corral mudslides, rockslides, and lava flows—to cite just a few 
examples.10  But society may spend at least as much time engineering 
legal constructs as it does rigs, dams, and arroyos.   
Whether in court, on the floor of the legislature, or in our everyday 
speech, our language and our legal fictions frequently reflect this 
perception of rights to possession and control in the face of natural 
phenomena.  Instead of describing our responsibilities in relationship 
with, or stewardship of, nature, we talk about our rights as owners of 
land, of water, of the air, of an unimpeded view of the sun.11  Delineating 
these property “rights,” even in the most tangible of these, land, has 
proven no easy task.  We have had to create doctrines of title and real 
property interests.  We name and define fees as simple and absolute 
when they are more truly neither.  We separate property interests into 
strands, or sticks, in a bundle—access, use, usufruct, exclusion—each a 
cognizable piece of property, theoretically capable of being allocated by 
gift or sale, or of being taken by the government.  In so doing, we create 
legal fictions of permanency in a world that reminds us every day of how 
impermanent our existence is.   
                                            
 8. On April 29, 2011, a federal judge approved the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers’ 
plan to blast a two-mile wide hole into its own levee on the Mississippi River.  Gerry 
Smith, In Illinois, Flooding Leads to Border Tension, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2011, 
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-illinois-flooding-
20110430,0,1959238.story.  Three days later, the Birds Point levee was blown open, 
inundating 130,000 acres of Missouri farmland and 90 homes in hopes of preventing 
flooding in Cairo, Illinois.  A.G. Sulzberger, River Level Drops After Blast at Levee, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 3, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/04/us/04levee.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&sq=River 
Level Drops after blast&st=cse&scp=1. 
 9. On April 20, 2011, when the risks of drilling deep into the sea floor from a 
floating offshore rig were underestimated, an explosion destroyed the platform, killed 
eleven people, and released over four million barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico.  BOB 
GRAHAM & WILLIAM REILLY, NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL 
AND OFFSHORE DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF 
OFFSHORE DRILLING vi (2011).  
 10. See, e.g., JOHN MCPHEE, THE CONTROL OF NATURE 190 (1989).  One of the more 
extreme examples of this urge can be found in recently proposed responses to global 
warming, including a geoengineering technique known as ocean iron fertilization, which 
seeks to promote algae growth in the ocean in order to increase global carbon absorption.  
See, e.g., Ken Buesseler et al., Ocean Iron Fertilization—Moving Forward in a Sea of 
Uncertainty, 319 SCI. 161 (2008).  
 11. Cf. JOSEPH K. ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY 16 (1826) 
(translating THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 2.1.1.).   
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Nowhere, perhaps, are these conflicts more apparent than at the 
ocean’s edge, where several common law doctrines, the most prominent 
of which are surveyed here, have attempted to describe rights in the 
midst of ever-shifting topographies.   
B.  Selected “Traditional” Doctrines 
1.  Shoreline Variations: Avulsion, Accretion, Erosion, and Reliction 
The urge to impose rules even upon the shifting sands is an ancient 
and universal one.  As the Michigan Supreme Court has observed, “All 
maritime nations, recognizing the vagaries of the sea . . . have evolved 
systems of law, founded upon . . . conceptions of common justice, to 
adjust and compensate its effects.”12   
As may already be apparent, the description of shoreline movements 
has required the creation of a specialized and specified vocabulary.  For 
example, “erosion” is the gradual and imperceptible13 wearing away of 
land from the shore or bank.  “Accretion” means the gradual and 
imperceptible accumulation of land along the shore or bank of a body of 
water.14  “Reliction” is an increase of the land by a gradual and 
imperceptible withdrawal of any body of water.15  “Avulsion” on the 
other hand, is the sudden or perceptible loss of or addition to land by the 
action of the water or a sudden change in the bed of a lake or the course 
of a stream.16   
According to one general, longstanding, and widely accepted rule, 
where a large body of water works gradually or imperceptibly to change 
the shoreline by deposits or erosion, the title of the riparian owner 
follows the shoreline “under what has been graphically called ‘a movable 
                                            
 12. Hilt v. Weber, 233 N.W. 159, 165 (Mich. 1930).  
 13. “Gradual and imperceptible” means that, although witnesses may periodically 
perceive changes in the waterfront, they could not observe them occurring. See BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 582 (8th ed. 2004); 65 C.J.S. Navigable Waters § 101 (2000); see 
generally FRANK E. MALONEY ET AL., WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION: THE FLORIDA 
EXPERIENCE 385-92 (1968). 
 14. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 13, at 22; C.J.S., supra note 13, § 94; 
see generally MALONEY ET AL., supra note 13, at 685-92. 
 15. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 13, at 1317; C.J.S., supra note 13, § 
94; see generally MALONEY ET AL., supra note 13, at 685-92. 
 16. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 13, at 147; C.J.S., supra note 13, § 94; 
see generally MALONEY ET AL., supra note 13, at 685-92.  “Alluvion” describes the actual 
deposit of land that is added to the shore or bank.  78 AM. JUR. 2d Waters § 315 (2002). 
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freehold.’”17  On the other hand, the equally widespread law is that the 
rapid addition or loss of land due to avulsion (that is, by a sudden natural 
phenomenon) does not affect the seaward boundary of the upland 
owner.18  Thus, under the common law of most states, “the legal effect of 
changes to the shoreline on the boundary between public lands and 
uplands varies depending upon whether the shoreline changes gradually 
and imperceptibly or whether it changes suddenly and perceptibly.”19   
In the end, then, “the principal significance of the distinction 
between erosion[, reliction], and accretion on the one hand, and avulsion 
on the other,” according to Blackstone’s age-old summary, 
is that the owner of the [upland] loses title to land that is lost by 
erosion and ordinarily becomes the owner of land that is added 
to his land by accretion [or reliction], whereas if an avulsion has 
occurred, the boundary line remains the same regardless of the 
change in the . . . shoreline.20 
There are four commonly cited rationales underlying these doctrines 
that attempt to balance the interests of the parties affected by inevitable 
changes in the shoreline: 
(1) [D]e minimis non curat lex; (2) he who sustains the burden 
of losses and of repairs imposed by the contiguity of waters 
ought to receive whatever benefits they may bring by accretion; 
(3) it is in the interest of the community that all land have an 
owner and, for convenience, the riparian is the chosen one; (4) 
the necessity for preserving the riparian right of access to the 
water.21  
Despite all these doctrinal distinctions and variations, the boundary 
in the vast majority of states between public lands and private uplands 
remains the mean high water line (MHWL), which represents an average 
                                            
 17. Id. at 165-166 (quoting Hallsbury, 28 Laws of England 361); see also COASTAL 
STATES ORG., INC., PUTTING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO WORK 108 (David C. Slade, 
R. Kerry Kehoe, Jane K. Stahl eds., 2d ed. 1997) [hereinafter COASTAL STATES ORG.]. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Walton Cnty. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. (STBR I), 998 So. 2d 1102, 
1113 (Fla. 2008).   
 20. STBR I, 998 So. 2d. at 1114 (citing 73 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d 167, 182); see 
also 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 6.03(b)(2) (2007); 78 AM. JUR. 2d Waters § 315 
(2002). 
 21. Bd. of Trs. of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Medeira Beach Nominee, 
Inc., 272 So. 2d 209, 212-13 (Fla. App. Ct. 1973); see also MALONEY ET AL., supra note 
13, at 685-92. 
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over a nineteen-year period.22  Thus, in cases of erosion, reliction, and 
accretion, the boundary between public and private land is a flexible 
MHWL, “altered to reflect gradual and imperceptible losses or additions 
to the shoreline.”23  Under the doctrine of avulsion, however, the MHWL 
does not move, and “the boundary between public and private land 
remains the MHWL as it existed before the avulsive event led to sudden 
and perceptible losses or additions to the shoreline.”24  
2.  The Common Enemy Doctrine 
Even with all these doctrines in place, the determination of what is a 
natural or artificial change in the shoreline due to accretion can be 
perplexing.  This is particularly true because “[n]early every area of 
public trust shoreline in the country has been modified to some degree, 
by groins, jetties, dams, seawalls, wharfs, piers, docks, hydraulic mining, 
beach nourishment, dredging and other actions.”25  Responding to this 
prevalence of engineered shoreline structures, courts of the past have 
also devised a “common enemy doctrine,” so called because it 
recognizes a an upland owner’s right to defend and armor his property 
against the erosive forces of the sea—the common enemy in question—
even to the detriment of his neighbor’s property.26    
                                            
 22. See, e.g., George M. Cole, Tidal Water Boundaries, 20 STETSON L. REV. 165, 166-
67 (1990).  This figure is rounded off from the 18.6 years it takes for the variations which 
occur in major tide producing forces to go through one complete cycle.  Frank E. 
Maloney & Richard C. Ausness, The Use and Legal Significance of the Mean High Water 
Line in Coastal Boundary Mapping, 53 N.C. L. REV. 185, 196 (1974).  In some states, 
this nineteen-year period for determining the MHWL is codified.  See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 
177.27 (14-15) (2007).  As to the boundary line, only Maine and four other states, all 
founding colonies (Massachusetts, Delaware, Pennsylvania, and Virginia), recognize 
private ownership rights all the way down to the low-water line, while Texas and Hawai’i 
recognize public rights all the way up to the natural vegetation line.  See Robin Kundis 
Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines: Classifications of 
States, Property Rights, and State Summaries (2007), available at 
http://works.bepress.com/robin_craig/1; see also infra note 51.  Under Roman civil law, 
the upper boundary of the public’s seashore went “as far as the greatest wave extended 
itself in the winter.”  ANGELL, supra note 11, at 65. Though no state’s public trust reaches 
this far today, the closest are in Texas and Hawai’i, where public easements are 
recognized up to the natural vegetation line.  See infra notes 183 (applicable Hawai’ian 
case law), 202 (applicable Texas statute). 
 23. STBR I, 998 So. 2d. at 1114. 
 24. Id.; see also, e.g., Bryant v. Peppe, 238 So. 2d 836, 838-39 (Fla. 1970). 
 25. COASTAL STATES ORG., supra note 17, at 110. 
 26. Under the common enemy doctrine: 
[a] man may raise an embankment on his own property to prevent the 
encroachments of the sea, although the fact of his doing so may be to cause the 
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3.  The Equal-Footing Doctrine 
Of great, if well camouflaged, significance in the coastal issues that 
arise, the equal-footing doctrine “creates a strong presumption,” based on 
agreements made to entice states and territories to join the union, “that 
newly admitted states acquire [without encumbrance of any kind] title to 
lands under navigable waters upon their admission to statehood.”27   The 
equal-footing doctrine has also played an important role in the 
revitalization of the public trust doctrine. 
4.  The Public Trust Doctrine 
a.  Ancient Roots 
The public trust doctrine, which holds that some things, by their 
nature, are common to all, is rooted in an ancient Roman precept of 
natural law.  This precept is most famously captured by the Institutes of 
Justinian:   
Things common to mankind by the law of nature, are the air, 
running water, the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea; 
no man therefore is prohibited from approaching any part of the 
seashore, whilst he abstains from damaging farms, monuments, 
edifices, etc. which are not in common as the sea is.28   
                                                                                                  
water to beat with violence against the adjoining lands, thereby rendering it 
necessary for the adjoining landowner to enlarge or strengthen his defenses.  
U.S. v. Milner, 583 F.3d 1174, 1189 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Revell v. People, 52 N.E. 
1052, 1059 (Ill. 1898)).  This same adversarial approach to natural phenomena is 
manifest in both everyday parlance and in judicial contexts, where reference is made to 
windborne and waveborne natural disasters that wreak havoc and devastation and cause 
losses of land and damages to the landscape that we need to repair.  See, e.g., DAVID M. 
BUSH, ORRIN H. PILKEY JR. & WILLIAM J. NEAL, LIVING BY THE RULES OF THE SEA 1 
(1996) [hereinafter RULES OF THE SEA] (reporting that Hurricane Hazel (1954) “raked the 
coast of the Carolinas” and “left a path of over $280 million in destruction”; Hurricane 
Betsy (1965) became the first hurricane to exceed $1 billion in damages; Hurricane 
Camille (1969) killed 256 along the Gulf coast and caused $1.4 billion in property loss; 
Hurricane Frederic (1979) “ran up a $2.3 billion bill in losses”; and Hurricane Hugo 
(1989) “left a wake of widespread destruction” along the coast).   
 27. Milner, 583 F.3d at 1183.   
 28. Bell v. Town of Wells (Bell II), 557 A.2d 168, 181 n.2 (Me. 1989) (Wathen, J., 
dissenting) (quoting JUSTINIAN INST. 2.1.1) (emphasis added).  Expressed with a slight 
variation, under Roman civil law, which was codified under Justinian between 529 and 
534 A.D., waters and shores were considered res nullius, incapable of being owned.  See 
COASTAL STATES ORG., supra note 17, at 4; ANGELL, supra note 11, at 17.  The original 
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The sixth century Institutes of Justinian were in turn based on the earlier 
second century Institutes and Journal of Gaius, another eminent Roman 
jurist, who had codified the even older natural law of Greek 
philosophers.29  Still another earlier classical jurist, Julian, found further 
justification for the public trust in the longstanding use of custom.30  To 
the extent, therefore, that they were not only “ancient in their own right,” 
but also rooted in even more ancient soil and time-tested by centuries of 
custom, “the Institutes of Justinian remain the touchstone of today’s 
Public Trust Doctrine.”31   
After ignoring these principles during the Middle Ages, English 
common law grew to recognize similar public, or sovereign, rights in all 
“those things which from their nature cannot be exclusively occupied and 
enjoyed,” including tidewaters and the lands beneath.32  Lord Chief 
Justice Hale, a noted jurist of the seventeenth century, observed that, 
though some private interest in the tidelands was possible, title to the 
intertidal zone remained presumptively with the sovereign.33  Indeed, in 
adopting the doctrine, English common law also strengthened it, 
imposing on the government “an affirmative duty to administer, protect, 
manage and conserve fish and wildlife.”34   
                                                                                                  
code acknowledged that the seashore was “subject to the same law as the sea itself, and 
the sand or ground beneath it,” and could not be considered private property.  Thomas 
Hodgins, Ancient Law of Nations Respecting the Sea and Sea-shore, 13 CANADIAN L. 
TIMES 16 (1893) (quoting JUSTINIAN INST. 2.1.5). 
 29. COASTAL STATES ORG, supra note 17, at 4. 
 30. “Immemorial custom is properly preserved as law and this is the law that is said to 
have been enacted by usage. For since statutes bind us for no other reason than that they 
have been received by the opinion of the people, properly also those things which the 
people have approved without any writing at all will bind all; for what does it matter 
whether the people declares its will by vote or by circumstances and conduct?  Wherefore 
even this principle is most rightly received that statutes are abrogated not only by vote of 
the legislator but also by the tacit consent of all through desuetude.”  JOHN P. DAWSON, 
THE ORACLES OF THE LAW 128 (1968) (quoting Dig. 1.3.32 (Julianus, Dig. 94)); see also 
Robert George, Comment, The “Public Access Doctrine:” Our Constitutional Right to 
Sun, Surf, and Sand, 11 Ocean & Coastal L. J. 73, 73 (2006).  
 31. COASTAL STATES ORG., supra note 17, at 4. 
 32. ANGELL, supra note 11, at 17. 
 33. Bell II, 557 A.2d at 181 (quoting HALE, DE JURE MARIS (ch. 4) (“The shore is that 
ground that is between the ordinary high-water mark and low-water mark. This doth 
prima facie and of common right belong to the king . . . . [S]uch shore may and 
commonly is parcel of the manor adjacent, and so may be belonging to a subject . . . yet 
prima facie it is the king’s”), reprinted in A COLLECTION OF TRACTS RELATIVE TO THE 
LAW OF ENGLAND FROM MANUSCRIPTS 12-13 (F. Hargrave 1st ed. 1787).  
 34. George, supra note 30, at 76. 
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English common law, of course, went on to become the law of the 
thirteen colonies, and then of the states.35  Accordingly, each of these 
held, and continues to hold, a public trust interest in its tidelands up to 
the ordinary high water mark.36  That said, “[e]ach also had, and 
continues to have, the authority to define the boundaries of the lands held 
in public trust as well as the authority to recognize private rights in its 
trust lands, and thus diminish the public’s rights therein as they see fit.”37 
b.  Defining the American Public Trust Lands 
In 1892, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed that each state had a 
duty to protect lands in the public trust, and that this obligation to 
preserve access under the public trust doctrine is inalienable.38  Among 
the common attributes of most public trust lands is the fact that “they are 
generally unsuitable for commercial agriculture or permanent 
structures.”39  And, “[b]ecause of the ‘public’ nature of trust lands, the 
title to them is not a singular title in the manner of most other real estate 
titles.”40  Instead, public trust land is viewed as being “vested with two 
titles: the jus publicum, the public’s right to use and enjoy trust lands and 
waters for commerce, navigation, fishing, bathing and other related 
public purposes, and the jus privatum, or the private proprietary rights in 
the use and possession of trust lands.”41  In other words, while in many 
ways the jus publicum title may be considered something less than fee 
simple ownership, it also cannot be sold.42   
At the same time, in another 1892 case, the Supreme Court signaled 
that it would not impose a single nationwide public trust doctrine, 
leaving each state to apply the public trust doctrine to lands and waters 
“within its borders according to its own views of justice and policy.”43  
As a result, “there are over fifty different applications of the [public 
                                            
 35. COASTAL STATES ORG., supra note 17, at 13. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id.; see also Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 (1894).    
 38. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 460 (1892).   
 39. COASTAL STATES, supra note 17, at 1.   
 40. Id.  
 41. Id.  
 42.The sovereign may dispose of its proprietary rights in trust lands, the jus privatum, 
but its obligation to manage trust lands in the public interest, the jus publicum, is 
inalienable.  A private lessee or owner may have possession and the benefits of certain 
rights, but his interest is subject at all times to superior public interests. 
RICHARD HILDRETH & RALPH W. JOHNSON, OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW 80 (1983). 
 43. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 (1894).   
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trust] doctrine, one for each State, Territory, or Commonwealth, as well 
as the federal government.”44   
In his landmark article at the vanguard of the twentieth-century 
renewal of the public trust doctrine, Professor Joseph Sax observed that 
courts would “look with considerable skepticism” upon any government 
action that restricted public rights to use and access any resource held by 
the state.45  Before long, “nearly every State ha[d] modified the English 
common law, either by Constitution or legislatively,” to curtail riparian 
rights for private owners and expand them for public access and use.46  
California and New Jersey described a broad, flexible doctrine of public 
trust, which adapts with changing times, and most other states followed 
suit.47  Even the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals took approving note:  
More recently, courts and commentators have found in the 
doctrine a dynamic common-law principle flexible enough to 
meet diverse modern needs.  The doctrine has been expanded to 
protect additional water-related uses such as swimming and 
similar recreation, aesthetic enjoyment of rivers and lakes, and 
preservation of flora and fauna indigenous to public trust lands. 
It has evolved from a primarily negative restraint on states’ 
ability to alienate trust lands into a source of positive state 
duties.48   
In 1988, the Supreme Court again stepped into the process of 
defining the public trust by declaring that each state, “upon entry into the 
Union, received ownership of all lands under waters subject to the ebb 
and flow of the tide.”49  According to the Court, “the States have interests 
in lands beneath tidal waters which have nothing to do with navigation,” 
                                            
 44. COASTAL STATES ORG., supra note 17, at 3.   
 45. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective 
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 490 (1970).   
 46. COASTAL STATES ORG., supra note 17, at 292. 
 47. George, supra note 30, at 78-79;  Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 
A.2d 355, 358 (N.J. 1984) (“The public’s right to use the tidal lands and water 
encompasses navigation, fishing, and recreational uses, including bathing, swimming, 
and other shore activities.”); Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 
294 A.2d 47, 54 (N.J. 1972) (“The public trust doctrine, like all common law principles, 
should not be considered fixed or static, but should be molded and extended to meet 
changing conditions and needs of the public it was created to benefit.”); State ex rel. 
Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 673 (Or. 1969) (public has access and enjoyment rights 
to all lands seaward of the vegetation line).   
 48. D.C. v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (footnotes omitted). 
 49. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 476 (1988).   
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such as “bathing, swimming, recreation, fishing, and mineral 
development.”50   
Maine, however, would prove resistant to this nearly universal 
recognition of extensive public trust rights in the tidelands.51 
II.  THE MOODY BEACH CASES 
A.  Factual Background 
Beginning in 1984 with a quiet title action that was anything but 
quiet, Moody Beach, a mile-long strand situated at the southern edge of 
the Town of Wells, Maine, became the focus of a heated and complicated 
legal debate that would last for years.52  At issue were the conflicting 
private and public claims to ownership and use rights in the wide wet-
sand, intertidal portion of Moody Beach.53 
                                            
 50. Id. at 476, 482.  
 51. All but five states would go on to recognize extensive public rights in the 
foreshore; only Maine and four other states, all of them among the thirteen original 
colonies and all of them endowed with statehood by 1790, insisted on adhering to pre-
statehood, colonial policies by limiting public access and use in the tidelands.  See Craig, 
supra note 22.  
 52. MARINE LAW INST., CITIZENS’ GUIDES TO OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW: PUBLIC 
SHORELINE ACCESS AND THE MOODY BEACH CASE 1 (1990) [hereinafter MLI GUIDE 
1990].   
Moody Beach is a sandy beach located within the Town of Wells. It is about a mile 
long and lies between Moody Point on the north, the Ogunquit town line on the 
south, the Atlantic Ocean on the east, and a seawall on the west.  Moody Beach 
has a wide intertidal zone with a strip of dry sand above the mean high water mark. 
More than one hundred privately owned lots front on the ocean at Moody Beach. 
In addition, the Town of Wells in the past has acquired by eminent domain three 
lots which it uses for public access to the ocean . . . Each lot is about 50 feet wide 
and is bordered on the west by Ocean Avenue . . . A public beach, now known as 
Ogunquit Beach, lies immediately to the south of Moody Beach; the Village of 
Ogunquit acquired that beach by eminent domain in 1925.   
Bell v. Town of Wells (Bell II), 557 A.2d 168, 170 (Me. 1989).  
 53. Intertidal land means “all land . . . affected by the tides between the mean high 
watermark and either 100 rods seaward from the high watermark or the mean low 
watermark, whichever is closer to the mean high watermark.” ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
12, § 572 (2011). That definition derives directly from the Colonial Ordinance of 1641-
47.  See Bell v. Town of Wells (Bell I), 510 A.2d 509, 512 (Me. 1986). “At times the 
alternative terms ‘flats,’  ‘foreshore,’ and ‘beachfront’ are used.”  Bell II, 557 A.2d at 169 
n.3.  The lots in question, plus another two miles of beachfront property, were reportedly 
purchased from the state in 1888 by a Portsmouth lawyer, who then resold them 
separately to private owners in the ensuing years, notwithstanding a mile-long stretch that 
he sold to the Town of Ogunquit.  Beach Ownership Splits Maine Town, N.Y. TIMES, July 
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In 1984, 28 of the over 100 homeowners whose homes abutted the 
beach, including the named plaintiff Edward Bell, sought a judicial 
declaration and injunction limiting the public’s use of the beach.54  
Expressing concerns over a perceived increase in public use of the beach 
and reluctance on the part of town officials to enforce against 
“trespassers,” the homeowners sought a court order “to prevent the 
public from walking, swimming, sunbathing, or using the beach in front 
of their homes for general recreational purposes.” 55 
According to Mr. Bell, who owned one of the houses on the beach 
for forty years, the town had put up signs directing the public to the 
beach and provided a public lifeguard on it.56  “People would come down 
through our property and sit on our steps and tie their dogs to our railing 
[or] start a baseball game, and these weren’t necessarily nice people.”57  
But one local resident, who had been celebrating the Fourth of July with 
her family on that beach for twenty-five years, summed up the feelings 
of many others: “It’s a crime that a handful of people can close public 
access to the ocean [on] the nicest stretch of sandy beach in Maine.”58  
The Wells town manager at the time countered, “people here have 
always used that beach,” and explained that part of the problem lies in 
the fact that, when the contiguous public beach in Ogunquit becomes 
crowded, people simply wander quite naturally over to Moody Beach, 
which, though technically a different beach in a different town, is 
visually inseparable.59  When initially presented with the question, the 
superior court validated the state’s claims of sovereign immunity and 
dismissed the case.60   
B.  The Decisions 
On appeal, however, the Law Court held that no sovereign immunity 
applied and vacated the judgment, sending the case back to the superior 
court with an explicitly indicated presumption for private ownership of 
                                                                                                  
11, 1989, http://www.nytimes.com/1989/07/11/us/beach-ownership-splits-maine-
town.html?pagewanted=1. 
 54. Bell II, 557 A.2d at 169.   
 55. MLI GUIDE 1990, supra note 52, at 1. 
 56. Beach Ownership Splits Maine Town, supra note 53. 
 57. Id.  The author knows of no assertion, and makes none here, of any public right to 
make use of the lot owners’ steps or railings. 
 58. Id.  
 59. Id.  
 60. Bell v. Town of Wells (Bell I), 510 A.2d 509, 510 (Me. 1986).   
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the tidelands.61  The court grounded its reasoning in a document 
predating Maine statehood by nearly two centuries, the Colonial 
Ordinance of 1641-1647, which provided for a public easement in the 
tidelands for fishing, fowling, and navigation.62  This decision came 
down May 23, 1986.63  In the interim, though, the state legislature had 
enacted the Public Trust in Intertidal Lands Act (PTILA), which was to 
take effect July 16, 1986.64  Nevertheless, after a four-week bench trial, 
the superior court entered judgments in the fall of 1987 in favor of the 
private landowners, declaring the PTILA unconstitutional and finding no 
public rights in Moody Beach beyond those afforded in the Colonial 
Ordinance of 1641-1647.65   
Upon subsequent review, the Law Court held that “the plaintiff 
oceanfront owners at Moody Beach hold title in fee to the intertidal land 
subject to an easement, to be broadly construed, permitting public use 
only for fishing, fowling, and navigation . . . and any other uses 
reasonably incidental or related thereto.”66  Acknowledging expanding 
public recreation needs,67 the court nonetheless further concluded that, 
because it “declare[d] an unlimited right in the public to use the intertidal 
land for ‘recreation,’” PTILA was unconstitutional.68  “The courts and 
the legislature cannot simply alter . . . long-established property rights to 
accommodate new recreational needs; constitutional prohibitions on the 
taking of private property without compensation must be considered.”69  
                                            
 61. Id.  
 62. Id. at 512-13. 
 63. Id at 509.  
 64. Public Trust in Intertidal Lands Act, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 §§ 571-573 
(2011); see also Bell II, 557 A.2d at 169 n.4; 1985 Me. Laws 782.  
 65. Bell I, 510 A.2d at 510.   
 66. Id. at 169. 
 67. Curiously, the Law Court took the time to note the superior court’s findings that 
strolling up and down the beach had indeed been established as an open and continuous 
public use and that the plaintiffs were “perfectly willing to permit this.”  Bell II, 557 A.2d 
at 170; but see id. at 192 (Wathen, J., dissenting) (“Twice in its opinion this Court 
mentions the finding of the Superior Court concerning the public’s habit of ‘strolling’ up 
and down the length of Moody Beach and the acquiescence of the private owners. 
Despite the shoreowners’ testimony that they would continue to permit this activity in the 
future, they are not bound to do so, and the Superior Court order, affirmed by this Court, 
does not acknowledge any right on the part of the public to stroll on the beach. This 
Court’s opinion does nothing to dispel the obvious conclusion that from this moment on, 
at Moody Beach and every other private shore in Maine, the public’s right even to stroll 
upon the intertidal lands hangs by the slender thread of the shoreowners’ consent.”) . 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id.; but see Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1034-1035 
(1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that states “should not be prevented from 
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Those “long-established property rights,” in the view of a 4-3 
majority of the Law Court, flowed from the Colonial Ordinance and 
subsequent local usage and practice that were made law in the new state 
of Maine “by force of article X, section 3 of the Maine Constitution.”70  
According to the Law Court, the PTILA imposed upon all intertidal land 
(defined by the Act in accordance with the Colonial Ordinance) an 
easement for “recreation” that was “unqualified,” “undefined,” and 
“unlimited.”71  Reasoning that this sort of recreation “without limitation” 
amounted to “much greater rights” for the public in the intertidal zone, 
the court concluded that, because it did not provide for compensation, the 
Act thus amounted to an unconstitutional taking of private property.72   
The interference with private property here, the Law Court 
concluded, amounted to a “wholesale denial” of an owner’s right to 
exclude the public.73  “If a possessory interest in real property has any 
meaning at all,” the court reasoned, “it must include the general right to 
exclude others.”74  Finally, the court analogized its holding to a 
contemporary decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, which found an 
unconstitutional taking, however slight the adverse economic impact on 
the owners, when California had conditioned a seaside building permit 
upon the private owners’ “mak[ing] an easement across their beachfront 
available to the public on a permanent basis.”75 
                                                                                                  
enacting new regulatory initiatives in response to changing conditions [because the] 
Takings Clause does not require a static body of state property law.”). 
 70. Bell II, 557 A.2d at 171; ME. CONST. art. X, § 3 (“All laws now in force in this 
State, and not repugnant to this Constitution, shall remain, and be in force, until altered or 
repealed by the Legislature, or shall expire by their own limitation.”).   
 71. Bell II, 557 A.2d at 177.  Compare id. at 176-177 with ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 
§§ 571-573 (2011).  The majority refers to the “sole exceptions” laid out by the statute, 
when there are in fact four.  Limitations include non-interference with existing structures, 
no use of motorized vehicles or watercraft without explicit authorization, and a provision 
that the municipality may exercise its authority to further limit permitted uses.  See id. § 
573(2)(B), (D), and (3).   
 72. The Law Court follows this conclusion with the requisite “parade of horribles” of 
all the objectionable activities the statute would permit, including baseball games and 
extended camping, none of which would actually be possible for more than a couple 
hours in the intertidal zone, which is, by definition, covered by water much of the day.  
Bell II, 557 A.2d at 177.   
 73. Id. at 178 (quoting Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561, 568 (Mass. 1974)). 
 74. Id. at 177 (quoting Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561 (1974)). 
 75. Id. at 178; see also Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 832 
(1987) (“We think a ‘permanent physical occupation’ has occurred, for purposes of that 
rule, where individuals are given a permanent and continuous right to pass to and fro, so 
that the real property may continuously be traversed, even though no particular individual 
is permitted to station himself permanently upon the premises.”). 
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C.  Dissent 
The dissent protested that the public rights had existed at common 
law and predated the Ordinance and the custom of private ownership.76  
It noted that the “grant of land” to the lower water mark by the 
Ordinance had been designed only for the times to promote commerce by 
encouraging the construction of wharves at private expense.77  “The 
common law,” it exhorted, “would ill deserve its familiar panegyric as 
the ‘perfection of human reason’ if it did not expand with the progress of 
society and develop with new ideas of right and justice.”78  It also 
pointed out the court’s error in not affording the legislative enactment of 
the PTILA a presumption of constitutionality.79  Finally, the dissent 
highlighted the paradoxical scenarios under the majority’s interpretation 
that would allow, for example, a picnic in a rowboat on the foreshore but 
prohibit a picnic on a blanket, or that would allow a man to stand knee-
deep in the water so long as he was looking for a lobster or crab, but not 
if he was “bathing.”80  Each of these arguments pierced a hole in the 
bulwark of the majority opinion, exposing a number of weaknesses that 
have been further probed in critiques and concurrences in the ensuing 
years.   
D. A Closer Look 
Taking its initial cue from the dissenting opinion, this Section will 
attempt to elaborate on some of the flaws in the underpinnings of the 
majority opinion—an unfortunate choice of law, an unsound theory, a 
mistaken statutory interpretation, an abrupt takings analysis, and 
compromising facts—that call its continuing legitimacy into question on 
legal and logical grounds alone.   
1.  Choices of Law 
First, the court’s reliance on the Colonial Ordinance of 1641-1647, to 
which it attributed its narrow construction of the public trust doctrine, 
was misplaced on multiple counts.  At the outset, the court chose to 
adhere to a literal reading of the ordinance and a selected reading of only 
                                            
 76. Bell II, 557 A.2d at 183-184 (Wathen, J., dissenting).  
 77. Id. at 185. 
 78. Id. at 189 (quoting In re Robinson, 33 A. 652, 654 (1895)).   
 79. Id. at 192. 
 80. Id. at 189 (citing Jeffrey D. Curtis, Coastal Recreation: Legal Methods for 
Securing Public Rights in the Seashore, 33 ME. L. REV. 69, 83 (1981)).  
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those Massachusetts cases that did the same to conclude that the drafters 
of the ordinance retained a public easement to the intertidal zone solely 
for the purposes of “fishing, fowling and navigation.”81   
Despite its claim to the contrary, the Bell II court could have taken a 
more flexible and equitable approach to interpreting the statute and the 
case law—one essential, as the dissent points out, to the very character of 
the evolving common law.  Such an approach was sanctioned by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Shively v. Bowlby82 and applied in the vast majority of 
states.   Claiming a lack of precedent on point, the court referred only to 
two Massachusetts cases, when, in fact, it could have easily and properly 
taken into consideration a whole host of public trust doctrine cases from 
coast to coast, as well as the U.S. Supreme Court.  The Massachusetts 
cases, moreover, were not nearly as unanimous as the Bell II majority 
portrayed them.  The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court had 
previously declared in 1863 that “It would scarcely be necessary to 
mention bathing, or the use of the water for washing, or watering cattle, 
preparation of flax, or other agricultural uses, to all which uses a large 
body of water, devoted to public enjoyment, would usually be applied.”83  
And that court had also held that “it would be too strict a doctrine” to 
limit the public trust in the tidelands to navigation alone, reasoning that 
the public trust “is wider in its scope, and it includes all necessary and 
proper uses, in the interest of the public.”84   
What’s more, though, the Bell II majority apparently also failed to 
consider the rationale underlying the colonial ordinance of 1641-1647.  
As even the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has recognized, the 
notion of “extending private titles to encompass land as far as mean low 
water line” was “an extraordinary step” taken by “colonial authorities” 
in order to promote the building of more wharves in a region of wide, 
gradually sloped beaches and flats.85  There simply is no longer any need 
to encourage the building of wharves, nor has there been one for at least 
decades.  Indeed, today the state is more likely to deny a permit for the 
                                            
 81. Bell v. Town of Wells (Bell I), 510 A.2d 509, 514-15 (Me. 1986); Bell II, 557 
A.2d at 169. 
 82. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894).  The U.S. Supreme Court has also 
recognized that it is within a state’s discretion to grant riparian rights to persons “whether 
owners of the adjoining upland or not, as it [is] considered for the best interests of the 
public.”  Id. at 26. 
 83. Inhabitants of W. Roxbury v. Stoddard, 89 Mass. 158, 167 (1863).   
 84. Home for Aged Women v. Commonwealth, 89 N.E. 124, 129 (Mass. 1909).   
 85. Op. of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 313 N.E.2d 561, 565 (Mass. 
1974) (citing Storer v. Freeman, 6 Mass. 435 (1810)) (emphasis added); see also George, 
supra note 30, at 79-80. 
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building of any wharf at Moody Beach.86  Without this underlying 
rationale, the provisions of the colonial ordinance lose their purpose and 
meaning.  There is, therefore, a galling quality to the court’s assertion 
that public and private rights in the foreshore today must conform to the 
decisions taken under exceptional circumstances by ancestors 350 years 
ago who undoubtedly had different conceptions of usual and unusual87 
and who were seeking to promote the building of structures society now 
restricts.  As property theorist Laura Underkuffler has observed, “All 
individual and public claims [to property] are subject to dispute, discard, 
evolution, and change, as societally constructed understandings.”88   
2.  Inapplicable Theories 
General theories of private property rights are similarly unavailing 
when it comes to the tidelands.  As with ordinances that lose their 
validity when their underlying economic development motives vanish, 
so, too, “private property is a form of state-sanctioned power [and] it is 
legitimate and worthy of respect only when it is adequately justified.”89  
And at least one commentator has shown in the pages of this journal that 
a policy of private ownership, even of the dry sand area of the shoreline, 
(much less the wet sand area) fails on theoretical grounds.90   
For example, John Locke’s labor theory of property, which was 
widely known in colonial America, asserted that “the right to own land . . 
. derives from working or ‘improving’ the land.”91  “As much Land as a 
Man Tills, Plants, Improves, Cultivates, and can use the Product of, so 
much is his Property.  He by his Labour does, as it were, inclose from 
the Common.”92  But this theory simply cannot apply to a foreshore that 
                                            
 86. See, e.g., Uliano v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 977 A.2d 400, 403, 408 (Me. 2009) 
(upholding the denial of a dock permit under a statute barring structure that would 
“unreasonably interfere with existing scenic, aesthetic, recreational, or navigational uses” 
(quoting 38 M.R.S. § 480-D(1) (2008))). 
 87. Notably, in 1641, Massachusetts also became the first colony to statutorily 
recognize slavery.  See THE MASSACHUSETTS BODY OF LIBERTIES, § 91 (1641), available 
at http://history.hanover.edu/texts/masslib.html. 
 88. LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER 93 
(2003). 
 89. Id. at 49 (quoting ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, THE LAND WE SHARE: PRIVATE PROPERTY 
AND THE COMMON GOOD 107 (2003)).   
 90. See generally Robert Thompson, Property Theory and Owning the Sandy Shore: 
No Firm Ground to Stand On, 11 OCEAN & COASTAL L. J. 47 (2005-2006).   
 91. Id. at 54.   
 92. Id. (quoting JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (1689) reprinted in 
PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND CRITICAL POSITIONS 17 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1978)).   
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can be neither worked not improved, land that cannot be tilled, planted, 
improved, or cultivated.   
Alternatively, the aggregate social utility theory, arguably the 
dominant moral justification for private property ownership in the United 
States, proposes a somewhat different rationale: “Private property exists 
and is legitimate because of the overall utility it generates for society as a 
whole.  With reasonably secure rights, a person can plant in the spring 
confident that she can harvest in the fall.”93  Again, though, of what use 
is it to either the individual or the public to guarantee the fall harvest of a 
seed planted in spring where no seeds can be planted?  Of what use is the 
guarantee of investment backed expectations where none can logically or 
legally be held?   
Thus, neither Locke’s labor theory nor the aggregate social utility 
theory, articulates any benefit that might lie in the private ownership of 
property of such a unique and inherently impermanent nature as 
tidelands.  As Thompson and others conclude, we have seen that the very 
nature of almost all public trust lands, is that they are unsuitable for 
possession and commercial or agricultural development; this is 
unquestionably true of beaches, and particularly of wet sand beaches.94   
Regardless of whether there can be legitimate private ownership 
rights in the tidelands, though, the Bell II court goes on to ground its 
decision in a fundamental right to exclude others, which seems to be 
based at least in part on concepts of privacy and nuisance theory.  The 
circumstances of Moody Beach,95 however, do not lend themselves to 
easy application of either theory.  For one, neighboring home lots may 
have fences between the houses, but there is no physical boundary 
between lots on the beach.96  Hypothetically, what if the owners of the 
neighboring lot are mean and boisterous and like to play frisbee and 
baseball on their foreshore right next door?  There are also several public 
rights-of-way on the beach that extend “perpendicular access” from 
Ocean Avenue between house lots down to the water’s edge.  Even just a 
quick look at satellite photos of the beach belies any notion of privacy or 
                                            
 93. Thompson, supra note 90, at 66 (quoting FREYFOGLE, supra note 89, at 118).   
 94. See id. at 60-61; see also City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 
73, 77 (Fla. 1974) (“The sandy portion of the beaches are of no use for farming, grazing, 
timber production, or residency—the traditional uses of land—but has served as a 
thoroughfare and haven for fishermen and bathers, as well as a place of recreation for the 
public.  The interest and rights of the public to the full use of the beaches should be 
protected.”).   
 95. Author site visit, March 10, 2010, 2:00p.m. – 3:00p.m. [hereinafter Author Site 
Visit].  
 96. Id. 
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exclusion in this topographical context.97  To focus in on the beachfront 
houses themselves is to realize, too, that, however subjective aesthetic 
judgments may be, an annual Fourth-of-July, low-tide barbecue can 
certainly be no more a pig in this parlor98 than many of the structures and 
pastimes on these heavily-built Ocean Avenue lots.  As a result, it is hard 
to imagine how the “exclusion” principle of private property could ever 
be meaningfully enforced when so many neighbors and so many 
members of the public are using the beach in such close proximity—all 
fully within their rights even as constrained by the Bell decisions.  In 
short, does the owner of a heavily-glazed house on a fifty-foot lot right 
on a beach that is contiguous to 125 other similar house lots and two 
public beaches really have a rightful expectation of privacy, or to exclude 
anyone from his fifty-foot strip of sand? 
3. Abrupt Takings Analysis   
And yet, it is precisely upon this exclusionary right that the Bell II 
court focuses its somewhat abrupt takings analysis.99  Having established 
for its own purposes a presumptive right of private ownership in the 
tideland, the courts likens the infringement of the PTILA to a total 
deprivation of the right to exclude, a “permanent invasion” like the one 
described in Nollan that, without compensation, made the statute 
unconstitutional.100  But, with one eye on the takings clause,101 a closer 
examination of the property in question, the extent to which this property 
                                            
 97. See Map of Moody Beach, GOOGLE MAPS, http://maps.google.com/ (search 
“Moody, ME”) [hereinafter GOOGLE MAP]; see also STEPHEN M. DICKSON, BEACH AND 
DUNE GEOLOGY, MOODY BEACH, WELLS, MAINE, available at 
www.maine.gov/doc/nrimc/mgs/pubs/online/dunes/01-439.pdf [hereinafter Dickson I]; 
STEPHEN M. DICKSON, BEACH AND DUNE GEOLOGY, MOODY BEACH, WELLS, MAINE, 
available at www.maine.gov/doc/nrimc/mgs/pubs/online/dunes/01-440.pdf  [hereinafter 
Dickson II] (overlaying geological and geographical identifiers onto 1986 aerial photos 
of the southern and northern halves of Moody Beach). 
 98. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926) (“A 
nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place, like a pig in the parlor instead 
of the barnyard.”).  One structure, in particular, a pink, four-story, pseudo-Mediterranean 
villa, stands out in both memory and satellite imagery. 
 99. For extensive discussion of the Bell II court’s takings analysis, see Alison Rieser, 
Public Trust, Public Use, and Just Compensation, 42 ME. L. REV. 5, 12-27 (1990). 
 100. See supra note 79, identifying Nollan as the “contemporaneous decision of the 
U.S. Supreme Court” invoked by the Bell II majority. 
 101. “[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”  
U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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was taken, and the actual compensation due, yields a different 
conclusion. 
a. False Analogy 
First, other than the fact that they both involve beaches, Bell II and 
Nollan are not really analogous at all.  In Nollan, the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that the bargained-for right of way for public passage constituted a 
taking in the Loretto branch of permanent invasions.102  “Traditionally,” 
it explained, “the right to exclude others has been deemed a fundamental 
stick in the bundle of property rights.”103  That makes for nice dicta for 
the Bell II majority to quote, but that is where its legitimate use in 
informing this case should end.  For one, Nollan, a case involving an 
exaction rather than a legislative taking, was emphatically not a public 
trust case. It also involved the dry sand area, open to passage 24 hours a 
day, of a beach where the public had no prior right of passage 
whatsoever, as opposed to the wet sand area already subject to a public 
easement in question here.104   
b. Property 
Disregarding the misplaced analogy to Nollan, the court still failed to 
define with any precision what constitutionally cognizable property was 
at issue here.  The U.S. Supreme Court has established both temporal and 
geographical criteria that need to be evaluated in determining such 
property.105  Given the court’s reverent mention of Nollan, a permanent 
                                            
 102. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 825 (1987). 
 103. COASTAL STATES ORG., supra note 17, at 367; see also Loretto v. Teleprompter 
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434-35 (1982) (“In short, when the ‘character of 
the governmental action’ is a permanent physical occupation of property, our cases 
uniformly have found a taking to the extent of the occupation, without regard to whether 
the action achieves an important public benefit or has only minimal economic impact on 
the owner.”) (citation omitted). 
 104. See Nollan 483 U.S. at 865 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“I do not understand the 
Court’s opinion in this case to implicate in any way the public-trust doctrine.”). 
 105. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cnty. of Los 
Angeles, California, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (establishing that temporary taking may still 
require compensation); Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning 
Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002) (establishing that 32-month moratorium on development 
may not necessarily constitute a taking); Loretto, 458 U.S. 419 (establishing per se 
takings rule where permanent physical occupation); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. 
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (establishing that there may not be a taking where 
only partial diminution in value of property). 
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physical invasion, and one of the fundamental sticks in the bundle of 
property rights, it seems reasonable to infer that it had some portion of 
the beach, or some portion of the right to exclude, or some combination 
of the two, in mind.   
But which portion of the beach?  The dry sand area was not in 
question in this case.  Meanwhile, Mr. Bell’s portion of the beach only 
extended fifty feet in width.  So, it seems likely that the portion in 
question would be the wet sand area within the fifty feet of Mr. Bell’s 
frontage.  Notably, at low tide, this area is certainly larger than any dry 
sand area on the beach.  That said, there are also temporal bounds on the 
area, since, on average, it is only exposed by the tides for approximately 
half of each day.  As a practical matter, most of the houses on Moody 
Beach are seasonal, and most of the visitors to the beach are seasonal, 
too, which in Maine, means that the area in question becomes a 
controversial one for half a year at most.   
And which portion of the right to exclude? The verb is transitive, so 
there logically needs to be some object or person that is excluded from 
the area in question.  Here, too, however, there are more limitations, 
because, in all his years of living on the beach, Mr. Bell never had any 
unlimited right to exclude.  For one, even after the court’s holding, any 
member of the public, whether nice or not, retained her rights, “broadly 
construed,” to access any tideland lot on the beach for purposes of 
“fishing, fowling, or navigation,” or “related activities.”  As many have 
pointed out, this would mean, in practice, that, so long as she had a 
fishing pole or a boat, she could stroll all over the beach, or picnic for 
hours.  Moreover, as the plaintiffs apparently pledged and both courts 
noted in a sotto voce aside, members of the public would still be 
permitted to stroll the beach.106   
What cognizable property right is left to be taken, then?  It would 
appear that the only thing left is the right of the owner, if he is present, to 
exclude certain people who are not fishing, fowling, navigating, or 
engaging in related activities, during half of every day, half of the year in 
a fifty-foot-wide lot that is bordered on both sides by more fifty-foot 
lots?  Taking these limitations together, how could any “invasion” be 
                                            
 106. “[A] citizen of the state may walk along a beach carrying a fishing rod or a gun, 
but may not walk along that same beach empty-handed or carrying a surfboard.”  Eaton 
v. Town of Wells, 760 A.2d 232, 248-49 (Me. 2000) (Saufley, J., concurring).  “As the 
dissent [in Bell II] so eloquently summed up, ‘the public’s right even to stroll upon the 
intertidal lands hangs by the slender thread of the shoreowners’ consent.’”  Id. at 249 
(quoting Bell II at 192 (Wathen, J., dissenting)).  
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deemed permanent?  And even if so, was this much narrower property 
interest actually taken by the PTILA? 
c. Taken, or A Mistaken Statutory Interpretation 
The Bell II majority made three critical missteps in its interpretation 
of the PTILA.  First, as the dissent noted, it failed in its facial review of a 
new statute to accord the legislation its due presumption of 
constitutionality.  Second, the court seemed to take offense at the 
“unlimited” nature of the public recreation described in the statute, when 
there are, in fact, four exceptions specified not to constitute permissible 
public recreation.107  Those limitations, appearing primarily under the 
unambiguous heading “Limitations,” include prohibitions against 
interference with existing structures, and on the use of motorized 
vehicles or watercraft without explicit authorization.108   
The court also failed to take adequate notice of the fact that the 
statute also provides for the municipality to further limit permitted uses, 
potentially even to an extent the court might have found acceptable.109  
Instead, glossing over these considerations, the court next set forth the 
requisite “parade of horribles” of all the unconscionable activities the 
statute would assertedly permit. These included baseball games and 
extended camping, neither of which would actually be possible for more 
than a couple hours in the intertidal zone, and both of which the 
neighbors on either side of any 50-foot lot could still do.110  With so 
many limitations already in place, and the distinct possibility that 
municipalities might have, pursuant to the statute, implemented even 
more limitations to adequately protect the private interest at stake, it 
seems fully possible that the PTILA, if given a chance to go into full 
effect, could do so without exercising a taking. 
                                            
 107. Compare Bell v. Town of Wells (Bell II), 557 A.2d 168, 176-177 (1989) with ME. 
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 73(2) (2011). 
 108. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 573(2). 
 109. Id. § 573(3).   
  110. Bell II, 557 A.2d at 177.  Because there were, in fact, a number of limitations 
described in the statute, one is left to speculate about the unstated rationale of the 
decision.  As the dissent notes, the enactment of the statute during the pendency of the 
Bell II hearings was probably meant to influence the outcome.  Did the justices take 
umbrage at this as some sort of interference?  Would the Bell II result have been different 
if the statute had been enacted just a couple years earlier?  If the statute had included just 
a couple more specific parameters describing allowed uses within the public trust? 
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d. Just Compensation 
Finally, even assuming there is a constitutionally cognizable property 
interest in such a limited right to exclude a few others, and even if it was 
taken by the PTILA even before the statute could be implemented, what 
compensation is due?  Of what monetary worth is that property interest?  
Can it really be the $50,000 per lot, as appraised by the town,111 or is this 
more akin to a Loretto situation, where the per se private property right 
has been upheld, but a token amount of one dollar would suffice in 
compensation for the loss of a partial right to exclude some of the public, 
from a narrow strip of land, for a fraction of each day during part of each 
year?112   
4. Summary 
In sum, a closer look at the reasoning of the Bell II decision in light 
of the actual topography of Moody Beach, reveals that the judicial 
cabining of “private” zones of this tideland is a theoretical exercise that 
has no meaningful basis in reality.  Furthermore, it might be worth 
considering that Edward Bell had been a homeowner on Moody Beach 
for thirty-five years before ever bringing any complaint.  Reportedly, he 
and his co-plaintiffs only did so because the Town of Wells had begun to 
direct people to the beach in the summer and to station a lifeguard there, 
which in turn attracted bigger crowds, some of whom apparently played 
baseball and were not so nice.  It might also be worth noting that, other 
than putting a stop to the lifeguard stands and busloads of tourists, the 
Law Court decision may not have had an immediate impact on Moody 
Beach itself that would seem to merit all those years and all those legal 
fees.  After all, the public still accesses the water and walks the beach 
and probably still today engages in more than just fishing, fowling, and 
navigation in those tidelands.  Insofar as a decision of the Law Court 
prevails as the law of the state, however, what may matter little for this 
one beach may have unforeseen consequences for other beaches 
                                            
 111. In 1989, Wells had ten of the 126 lots appraised to see about purchasing tidelands.  
The result was a figure of about $516,000.  If a representative figure, then all tidelands on 
Moody Beach would cost about $6.5 million.  A subsequent revocable license negotiated 
by the town and owners was later rejected by voters at a town meeting in 1990.  MARINE 
LAW INST., CITIZENS’ GUIDES TO OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW: PUBLIC SHORELINE ACCESS 
IN MAINE 9 n.7 (2004) [hereinafter MLI GUIDE 2004]. 
 112. ROBERT ELLICKSON & VICKI BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS 168 (2005) (noting that 
the final result in Loretto. was that the cable and the regulation remained in place for the 
token price of $1 in compensation). 
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throughout the state.  The specter of this wrongly decided case needs to 
be exorcised once and for all so that Maine can join the vast majority of 
its fellow states in building a more sustainable relationship between its 
citizens and the sea.   
III.  RECENT LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS AT THE SHORELINE 
As anomalous as a doctrine of private rights in the tidelands may 
have been two decades ago, the Bell II ruling by the Law Court in Maine 
has grown only more distant from legal regimes in other coastal states, 
where legislatures and courts have increasingly articulated diminished 
private rights, expanded public rights, and a growing deference towards 
natural forces at the seashore.  
A.  Case Study 1: Florida, Beach Renourishment, and Access vs. Contact 
1.  Factual Background 
Starting in 1995 with Hurricane Opal, followed in 1998 by Hurricane 
Georges, and then twice more in 2002 and 2004 with Hurricanes Isidore 
and Ivan, the beaches in Walton County, Florida were subjected to storm 
after large storm.113  One of these beaches, to a large extent wiped out, 
would go on to occupy county and state officials, public and private 
parties asserting conflicting rights, and court after court for years to 
come. 
Pursuant to state statute, the Florida Department of Environmental 
Protection identified the “problem” of these “damaged” beaches and 
placed them on its list of “critically-eroded beaches,” prompting both the 
city and county to initiate the process of beach “renourishment.”114  In 
response, six private upland owners formed a not-for profit association 
called Stop the Beach Renourishment (STBR) to challenge the three-year 
permitting and renourishment process in administrative and judicial 
forums.115  
                                            
 113. STBR I, 998 So. 2d 1102, 1106 (Fla. 2008). 
 114. Id.  “‘In 2005, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers pumped $156 million [worth] of 
sand onto Florida beaches to replace what was washed away by rising sea levels and 
more intense storms.’”  Forrest J. Bass, Calming the Storm: Public Access to Florida’s 
Beaches in the Wake of Hurricane-Related Sand Loss, 38 STETSON L. REV. 541, 570 
(2009) (quoting Surfrider Foundation, State of the Beach Report: The Bad and The Rad, 
BEACHAPEDIA.ORG, http://www.beachapedia.org/State_of_the_Beach/Bad_and_Rad (last 
visited Mar. 7, 2011).  
 115. See STBR I, 998 So. 2d at 1106. 
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The Florida Supreme Court, in a strictly limited holding, upheld the 
policy of public restoration of even previously private, critically eroded 
beaches and the constitutionality of the state’s Beach and Shore 
Preservation Act.116  But this supposedly narrow holding, involving a 
small group of homeowners protesting a beach already rebuilt, was 
nonetheless controversial enough to gain the attention of the U.S. 
Supreme Court.117   
2.  The Beach and Shore Preservation Act 
In 1961, the Florida legislature declared “beach erosion [to be] a 
serious menace to the economy and general welfare of the people of 
[Florida].”118  The legislature further declared it “a necessary 
governmental responsibility to properly manage and protect Florida 
beaches . . . from erosion,” and to fund beach nourishment projects.119   
Based on these determinations, the legislature enacted the Beach and 
Shore Preservation Act (BSPA) and delegated to the state’s Department 
of Environmental Protection (DEP) the authority to identify “those 
beaches which are critically eroded and in need of restoration and 
nourishment” and to “authorize appropriations to pay up to 75 percent of 
the actual costs for restoring and renourishing a critically eroded 
beach.”120  The restoration process in this case, a typical one, involved 
extensive surveying to fix both a mean high water line (MHWL) and 
erosion control line (ECL) (here, the same line) and to plan the dredging 
that would “renourish” the beaches.121   
But STBR, consisting of six owners of beachfront property in the 
area of the proposed project, had other ideas, and brought a constitutional 
challenge to this application of the BSPA.122  Specifically, STBR claimed 
                                            
 116. Id. at 1105.  
 117. STBR I, 998 So. 2d 1102, cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2792, (U.S. June 15, 2009) 
(No. 08-1151). 
 118. STBR I, 998 So. 2d at 1107 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 161.088 (LexisNexis 2010)).   
 119. Id.   
 120. STBR I, 998 So. 2d at 1107-08 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 161.101(1) (LexisNexis 
2010)).   
 121. STBR I, 998 So. 2d at 1107-08.  The dredging plan included two options, one of 
which was to use a large vacuum and pipeline to pump sand from a submerged shoal to 
the area to be renourished.  Id. at 1106. 
 122. Id. at 1106 n.5.  The DEP, following administrative hearings, had issued a final 
order approving the beach renourishment permit.  Id. at 1106-07.  The “Joint Coastal 
Permit and Authorization to Use Sovereign Submerged Lands” refers to the state’s status, 
under both common law and statute as sovereign titleholder of the submerged bottoms.  
Id. at 1106, 1108 n.8; see also FLA. STAT. § 161.181 (LexisNexis 2010).  It was this order 
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that the section of the BSPA that “fixes the shoreline boundary after the 
ECL is recorded, unconstitutionally divests upland owners of all 
common law littoral rights [including rights to accretion and reliction] by 
severing these rights from the uplands.”123   
3.  To the State Supreme Court 
Finding the constitutional issue raised to be “of great public 
importance,” the intermediate court of appeals thus certified the question 
of whether the statute here acted in such a way as to deprive the private 
landowners of their “riparian” rights without just compensation.124  To 
the consternation of the dissent, see infra, the first step of the majority of 
the Florida Supreme Court was to rephrase the certified question to read 
as a facial challenge: “On its face, does the Beach and Shore 
Preservation Act unconstitutionally deprive upland owners of littoral125 
rights without just compensation?”126  In choosing to review the statute’s 
constitutionality on its face rather than in this application, the court 
granted itself the power of de novo review, accorded the statute a 
presumption of constitutionality, and raised the burden of the challenge 
to one requiring a showing that “no set of circumstances exists under 
which the statute would be valid.”127   
4.  Applying the Doctrines  
With the bar thus set, the court delved into Florida’s public trust 
doctrine.  “Under both the Florida Constitution and the common law,” 
the court declared, “the State holds the lands seaward of the MHWL, 
including the beaches between the mean high and low water lines, in 
trust for the public for the purposes of bathing, fishing, and 
                                                                                                  
that STBR challenged in the Florida’s First District Court of Appeals.  STBR I, 998 So. 
2d at 1107. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 1105.  
 125. Though occasionally used more broadly, or even interchangeably in cases and 
statutes, “[t]he term ‘riparian owner’ applies to waterfront owners along a river or stream, 
and the term ‘littoral owner’ applies to waterfront owners abutting an ocean, sea, or 
lake.”  Bd. of Trs. of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Sand Key Assocs., Ltd., 
512 So. 2d 934, 936 (Fla. 1987); see also JOHN M. GOULD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
WATERS § 148 at 297 n.1 (3d ed. 1900) (“Littoral is derived from Latin litus, the sea-
shore.”).   
 126. STBR I, 998 So. 2d at 1105.  The dissent refers to this step as “a manipulation.”  
See id. at 1121 (Lewis, J., dissenting).   
 127. Id. at 1105, 1116 n.12. 
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navigation.”128  “Concisely put,” the court summarized, “the State has a 
constitutional duty to protect Florida’s beaches, part of which it holds ‘in 
trust for all the people.’”129  On the other hand, the court went on to 
acknowledge that private upland owners have their own array of rights 
that figure into the question sub judice.130   
In Florida, private upland owners hold the same (no more, no less) 
bathing, fishing, and navigation rights as the public.131  That said, 
“upland owners [also] hold several special or exclusive common law 
littoral rights: (1) the right to have access to the water; (2) the right to 
reasonably use the water; (3) the right to accretion and reliction; and (4) 
the right to the unobstructed view of the water.”132  These littoral rights, 
the court recognized, are not subordinate to any public rights and may 
not be taken by act or regulation of the state without just compensation; 
nor do any of these rights require a separate act of creation, as they are 
incidental to littoral ownership.133  The rights to access, use, and 
uninterrupted view are considered easements under the law and give no 
title to land under navigable waters.134 
But the court drew a distinction between these rights and the rights to 
accretion and reliction:   
The rights to access, use, and view are rights relating to the 
present use of the foreshore and water.  The same is not true of 
the right to accretion and reliction. The right to accretion and 
reliction is a contingent, future interest that only becomes a 
possessory interest if and when land is added to the upland by 
 accretion or reliction.135  
                                            
 128. Id. at 1109 (citing FLA. CONST. art. X, § 11). 
 129. Id. at 1110-1111 (citing FLA. CONST. art. X, § 11). 
 130. Id. at 1111.  It noted, too, that these common law rights vary state by state.  Id. at 
1111-12 n.9 (pointing out, as an example, differences between littoral rights in 
Mississippi and North Carolina).   
 131. Id. at 1111.   
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 1111-12 n. 10 (citing Jon W. Bruce, THE LAW OF EASEMENTS AND LICENSES 
IN LAND § 1.02 (1995)).   
 134. Id. at 1112. 
 135. Id. at 1112 (citing Brickell v. Trammell, 82 So. 221, 227 (Fla. 1919) (“[Littoral] 
rights . . . give no title to the land under navigable waters except such as may be lawfully 
acquired by accretion, reliction, and other similar rights.”); cf. Restatement of Property § 
153 (1936)).   
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Inevitably, though, any discussion of these littoral rights requires 
some examination of the “dynamic boundary” on the shoreline between 
public lands and private lands, and this was the court’s next task.136   
5.  Balancing Public and Private Interests  
Noting that “Florida’s common law ha[d] never fully addressed how 
public-sponsored beach restoration affects the interests of the public and 
the interests of the upland owners,” the court turned to an analysis of the 
statute’s balancing of public and private interests:137   
By authorizing the addition of sand to sovereignty lands, the Act 
prevents further loss of public beaches, protects existing 
structures, and repairs prior damage.  In doing so, the Act 
promotes the public’s economic, ecological, recreational, and 
aesthetic interests in the shoreline.  On the other hand, the Act 
benefits private upland owners by restoring beach already lost 
and by protecting their property from future storm damage and 
erosion.  Moreover, the Act expressly preserves the upland 
owners’ rights to access, use, and view, including the rights of 
ingress and egress.  The Act also protects the upland owners’ 
rights to boating, bathing, and fishing.  Furthermore, the Act 
protects the upland owners’ view by prohibiting the State from 
erecting structures on the new beach except those necessary to 
prevent erosion.138 
Thus, the court concluded, in granting title in any new dry land to the 
State without impairing any of the upland owners’ rights to access, use, 
or view, the Act does not facially exercise a taking.139 
Turning next to the decision of the district court of appeals, the 
Florida Supreme Court faulted the lower court for failing to take into 
consideration the doctrine of avulsion, which, according to the court’s 
reasoning, would recognize the public’s right to reclaim its land lost in 
                                            
 136. See STBR I, 998 So. 2d at 1112. 
 137. Id. at 1114.  “Florida’s common law attempts to bring order and certainty to this 
dynamic boundary in a manner that reasonably balances the affected parties’ interests.”  
Id. at 1112.   
 138. Id. at 1115 (citations omitted).   
 139. Id.  In case there were any fears that rights would be infringed if the State were 
not to uphold its end of the bargain, the court added, “the Act provides for the 
cancellation of the ECL if (1) the beach restoration is not commenced within two years; 
(2) restoration is halted in excess of a six-month period; or (3) the authorities do not 
maintain the restored beach.”  Id. 
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the avulsive event.140  This effect of the doctrine of avulsion, explained 
the court, enables the statute to pass muster under a constitutional 
analysis.141  In the court’s eyes, the public, by the State in trust, was 
equally an owner that had lost its land due to the avulsive event and was 
thereby rightfully reclaiming it by restoring the beach up to the previous 
MHWL.142  Because the beachfront had been wiped out in a hurricane, 
which is an avulsive event, the doctrine of accretion, the court further 
concluded, did not apply to this case.143 
Finally, and perhaps most controversially, the court held that contact 
with the water is not a fundamental littoral right in and of itself but rather 
a corollary to the littoral right of access to the water; here, the court 
reasoned, any alleged loss of contact was immaterial, because the right 
of access has been preserved in its entirety.144 
6.  Dissent 
It was this last bit of reasoning that inflamed the dissent, which 
lamented what it called the “tortured logic” of the majority opinion that 
“butchered” Florida law.145  “To speak of riparian or littoral rights 
unconnected with ownership of the shore,” the dissent asserted, “is to 
speak a non sequitur.”146  Interestingly, in an earlier case addressing 
related issues, the dissent there had gone on to add, “Hopefully, the 
Supreme Court will take jurisdiction and extinguish this rather ingenious 
but hopelessly illogical hypothesis.”147  And, indeed, though it had passed 
on the opportunity in Belvedere, this time around the U.S. Supreme 
Court granted certiorari in the summer of 2009.148 
                                            
 140. See id. at 1116-17. 
 141. Id. at 1117. 
 142. Id.  
 143. Id. at 1118-19. Remember that, where there is gradual and imperceptible accretion 
or reliction, the private ownership rights may expand, but where there is sudden change 
in the shoreline, the boundary of ownership does not move.  See C.J.S., supra note 13, § 
94. 
 144. STBR I, 998 So. 2d at 1119-20.     
 145. Id. at 1121-22 (Lewis, J., dissenting). 
 146. Id. at 1121 (quoting Belvedere Dev. Corp. v. Div. of Admin., Florida Dep’t. of 
Transp., 413 So. 2d 847, 851 (Fla. App. Ct. 1982) (Hersey, J., concurring specially)).   
 147. Id. at 1122 (citing Belvedere, 413 So. 2d at 851 (Hersey, J., specially concurring)). 
 148. STBR I, 998 So. 2d 1102, cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2792, (U.S. June 15, 2009) 
(No. 08-1151). 
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7. To the U.S. Supreme Court  
Given the excitement it caused among private property advocates 
and land use planners, STBR’s actual decision came as something of an 
anti-climax when it was handed down in June 2010.149  With varying 
amounts of obiter banter about proper takings analysis and the 
underlying validity or applicability of the judicial takings doctrine, the 
U.S. Supreme Court unanimously upheld the Florida Supreme Court’s 
decision.150  What is perhaps most remarkable is how little attention was 
paid to the provisions of Florida law that would be blasphemy in Maine 
or Massachusetts.151  Not even Justice Breyer, a native of the First 
Circuit, found Florida’s interpretation of the public trust doctrine worthy 
of even a footnote.152  None of the justices found it even remotely 
questionable that state law might not recognize a fundamental private 
property right to contact with the water, much less possible future 
accretions.153  The notion that a state actor might cross private property in 
order to rebuild a public beach where a private beach once existed did 
not appear to upset the court in the least.154  In short, an even more 
expansive version of the sort of public trust rights than the one that 
Maine’s Supreme Judicial Court found so repugnant is apparently wholly 
unobjectionable in the eyes of the Florida Supreme Court and the U.S. 
Supreme Court, who found it to be guaranteed by the state constitution, 
state statute, and a fair balancing of traditional common law rights.   
8. Lessons Learned 
Here, then, is a state court that applied a very deferential standard, 
perhaps to a fault, to a facial review of a public trust statute.  Here, too, 
thanks in part to a constitutional and a statutory guarantee, but also to a 
strong common law tradition is a very different balancing of the public 
and private rights in the shoreline.  Here is a vision of the public trust 
rights in the shoreline so expansive as to allow the state to rebuild a 
formerly private beach lost in a storm, so expansive as to content itself 
with the protection of private rights to use, view, and access, without 
necessarily guaranteeing contact to upland owners.  In this view of public 
                                            
 149. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Envtl. Prot. (STBR II), 130 
S. Ct. 2592 (2010). 
 150. Id. at 2613. 
 151. See generally STBR II, 130 S. Ct. 2592. 
 152. See id. at 2618-19 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 153. See generally STBR II, 130 S. Ct. 2592. 
 154. Id. 
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trust rights, the court emphasizes the dynamic nature of the shoreline, 
and the contingency of any possible interests, and there is virtually no 
mention whatsoever of any right to exclude.  Finally, here is a Supreme 
Court of the United States utterly unfazed by such extensive public rights 
and unanimously willing to affirm such an expansive public trust 
doctrine.  
B.  Case Study 2: Trespass by Reliction in the Pacific Northwest 
1.  Factual Background 
While hurricanes were pounding the Gulf Coast of Florida, a much 
more surreptitious force was at work in the Pacific Northwest.  Thanks to 
steady erosive currents, the high tide line off a portion of the Washington 
coast was slowly rising, to the point where, in one instance, it subsumed 
some previously existing “shore defense structures,” which had been 
built, apparently in vain, to limit erosion.155  The anti-erosion measures 
had been taken by private homeowners leasing tidelands from the U.S. 
government, which held them in trust to the Lummi Nation pursuant to a 
treaty signed by President Ulysses S. Grant.156  Claiming that the new 
high-water mark157 made the structures trespassory obstacles to 
navigation in sovereign submerged lands, the United States sued for their 
removal.158  The waterfront homeowners challenged the lower court’s 
order for the removal of the structures, and the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was thus presented with the question 
“whether a group of waterfront homeowners are liable for common law 
trespass and violations of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 
1899159 . . . because the ambulatory tideland property boundary has come 
to intersect shore defense structures the homeowners have erected.”160  
Given the dynamic and complex nature of the shoreline environment and 
the pertinent legal principles, the court was unsurprised that it would be  
“at the boundary between the tidelands and the uplands that the present 
dispute finds its locus.”161 
                                            
 155. United States v. Milner, 583 F.3d 1174, 1180-81 (9th Cir. 2009).   
 156. Id.   
 157. As in Florida, the Ninth Circuit measures its tideland boundaries by MHWL as 
determined over the course of a 18.6-year period.  Id. at 1181. 
 158. Id. at 1181. 
 159. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (2010).  
 160. Milner, 583 F.3d at 1180.   
 161. Id. at 1181. 
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2.  Conclusions and Dispositive Facts 
Among the relevant historic facts behind the complex ownership 
arrangement of these tidelands was President Grant’s explicit expansion 
in 1873 of the Lummi reservation to include tidelands down to “the low 
water mark on the shore.”162  Coupled with the fact that the state of 
Washington had specifically disavowed any claim to submerged tribal 
lands upon statehood,163 this explicit and long-recognized exercise of 
federal jurisdiction persuaded the Ninth Circuit that the otherwise wholly 
valid equal-footing doctrine would not supersede federal jurisdiction 
over the Lummi tidelands.164    
In applying common law principles in this federal context, the court 
did not find the common enemy doctrine to be dispositive.  At the outset 
of its discussion, the court noted how “recurring and difficult” coastal 
zone property issues can be given the inherently fluctuating nature of the 
shoreline and the delicate balance of federal and state interests in 
submerged lands.165  Also important, observed the court, was the balance 
between private and public interests: 
On the one hand, courts have long recognized that an owner of 
riparian or littoral property must accept that the property 
boundary is ambulatory, subject to gradual loss or gain 
depending on the whims of the sea.  On the other hand, the 
common law also supports the owner’s right to build structures 
upon the land to protect against erosion.166  
According to the court, however, the common enemy doctrine was 
simply inapposite under the circumstances, because “both the Lummi 
and the Homeowners must accept that . . . both the tidelands and the 
uplands are subject to diminishment and expansion based on the forces 
of the sea.”167     
                                            
 162. Id. at 1180.   
 163. Id. at 1184. 
 164. Id. at 1183. 
 165. Id. at 1186.    
 166. Id. at 1186-87 (internal citations omitted) (“If a landowner whose lands are 
exposed to inroads of the sea[ ] . . . erects sea walls or dams for the protection of his land, 
and by so doing causes the tide, the current, or the waves to flow against the land of his 
neighbor . . . [he] is not responsible in damages to the latter, as he has done no wrong 
having acted in self-defense, and having a right to protect his land.”).   
 167. Id. at 1188.  In so holding, the Ninth Circuit panel also specifically rejected the 
notion that the dry uplands might have more value than tidelands.  Id.  The court 
explained:  
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Consequently, the court determined that the initial legal status of the 
shore defense structures did not foreclose the possibility that the very 
same structure might, under changed circumstances, subsequently be 
held in violation of the common law of trespass.168  In addition, the court 
found that the homeowners’ conscious refusal to comply with an order to 
remove the riprap in question satisfied the required elements of intent 
and causation in order to find that a trespass had, in fact, occurred.169  
Finally, the court took on the state-federal balancing question inherent in 
the federal statutory claims brought against the homeowners.  Ultimately, 
the submerged riprap, which now lay in navigable waters without Corps 
approval, was held to be in violation of section 10 of the Rivers and 
Harbors Act (RHA), which prohibits the creation of, “any obstruction not 
affirmatively authorized by Congress . . . to the navigable capacity of any 
of the waters of the United States.”170   
Accordingly, the homeowners were ordered to remove their shore 
defense structures.171  Spelling out the moral of this controversy, the 
court admonished would-be private shorefront builders: “[O]ne who 
develops areas below the MHW line does so at his peril.”172  Thus, with 
rising seas and eroding shorelines, federal common law principles of 
trespass can act in concert with federal statutes to supersede private 
                                                                                                  
the tidelands have played an important role in the Lummi’s traditional 
way of life, and in most other areas, the tidelands are held by the state in 
trust for the public.  These interests are substantial, and the uses they 
represent are not obviously less ‘productive.’ (‘[Lands under tide 
waters] are of great value to the public for the purposes of commerce, 
navigation, and fishery. Their improvement by individuals, when 
permitted, is incidental or subordinate to the public use and right.’).  
Id.   
 168. Id. at 1183. 
 169. Id. at 1182-1183.  Federal common law generally aligns with the Restatement of 
Torts, under which, “a person is liable for trespass ‘if he intentionally . . . causes a thing 
[to enter land in the possession of another], . . . [or] fails to remove from the land a thing 
which he is under a duty to remove.’  Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158 
(2009)); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 161; 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trespass § 19 
(2009) (“A trespass may be committed by the continued presence on the land of a 
structure, chattel, or other thing that the actor or a predecessor in legal interest has placed 
on the land and failed to remove.”).  According to the court, “[i]t is enough that the 
Homeowners caused the structures to be erected and that the structures subsequently 
rested on the tidelands.”  Milner, 583 F.3d at 1191.   
 170. Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 403).    
 171. Id. at 1191. 
 172. Id. at 1192 (quoting Leslie Salt Co. v. Froehlke, 578 F.2d 742, 753 (9th 
Cir.1978)). 
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property interests in favor of a somewhat expansive federal public trust 
doctrine.    
C.  Case Study 3: Shifting Sands in Hawai’i 
1.  Factual Background 
Unsurprisingly, the issue of changing shorelines is a persistent one in 
Hawai’i, too.  The most recent case of shifting sands to reach the 
appellate level there was filed in May 2005 by beachfront landowners on 
O’ahu, who challenged the constitutionality of Act 73.173  Act 73, signed 
into law just two years earlier, had redefined accretion, limited existing 
claims of private shorefront owners, and asserted state ownership in trust 
for the Hawai’ian people over any other future accreted lands that could 
not be claimed by private owners.174  Plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that 
Act 73 exercised an unconstitutional taking of the owners’ present and 
future rights to accreted beachfront lands, and damaged their remaining 
property by cutting it off from the water.175   
The trial court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, finding 
that Act 73 “represented a sudden change in the common law and 
effected an uncompensated taking” of both the littoral owners’ accreted 
land, and the littoral owners’ right to ownership of future accreted 
land.176  
2.  Hawai’ian Common Law and Custom  
 The intermediate court of appeals, after mining longstanding  
Hawai’ian case law, saw things differently.177  In 1889, the Hawai’i 
Supreme Court had held, based on its translations of deed documents 
bounding waterfront parcels, that land granted “[a] hiki i kahakai”  
(reaching to high water mark), extended to the sea and that the owner’s 
rights extended with any accretion.178  The court had concluded in 1968 
                                            
 173. Maunalua Bay Beach Ohana 28 v. Hawai’i, 222 P.3d 441, 441 (Haw. Ct. App. 
Dec. 30, 2009).  The full text of Act 73 can be found at 2003 Haw. Sess. Laws at 128. 
 174. This came only 18 years after Act 221 declared that private oceanfront owners 
could not claim any accretions as sufficiently “permanent” to warrant title until the 
passage of 20 years.  An Act Relating to Accretion, 1985 Haw. Sess. Laws at 401; see 
also Maunalua Bay, 222 P.3d at 453-54. 
   175. Maunalua Bay, 222 P.3d at 441-42. 
 176. Id. at 443. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Halstead v. Gay, 7 Haw. 587 (1889); see also Maunalua Bay, 222 P.3d 441, 445 
(Haw. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2009) (quoting Halstead, 7 Haw. at 589-90).   
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that the traditional term “make kai,” or “along the sea,” meant that a plot 
was ultimately bounded not by a surveyor’s azimuths or calculations of 
mean high water but by the high water mark as determined by the natural 
vegetation line and the traditional testimony of local, native-born 
Hawai’ians known as kamaainas.179  A 1973 decision acknowledged an 
extension of property rights to the high water mark, but determined that 
the landowners’ rights were subject to such natural forces as erosion, 
which might make that high water mark, presumptively the edge of the 
vegetation line, move over time.180  Citing the public trust doctrine, the 
court held that any land lost to erosion “below the . . . seaward boundary 
line . . . belongs to the State of Hawai’i, and the defendants should not be 
compensated therefore.”181  The court reaffirmed this holding in 1977, 
specifying that the disappearance and reappearance of sands in annual 
cycles cannot be considered “permanent” gain or loss, and that “the 
specific distances and azimuths given for high water mark in 1951 are 
not conclusive, but are merely prima facie descriptions of high water 
mark, presumed accurate until proved otherwise.”182  
In another 1977 case, the court recalled that, historically, “the people 
of Hawai’i are the original owners of all Hawai’ian land” and that a 
system of private title did not emerge until King Kamehameha bowed to 
the pressure of “foreign” residents.183  Thus, the court reasoned, a lava 
extension into the sea vested “when created in the people of Hawai’i, 
held in public trust by the government for the benefit, use and enjoyment 
of all the people.”184  In reaching this conclusion, the court took note that, 
in California, “it is also well settled that being cut off from contact with 
the sea is not basis for proper complaint.”185  Acknowledging the 
“paucity of land in our island state” and the potential inequitable windfall 
to a private owner, the court assured the upland owners that they would 
                                            
 179. In re Ashford, 440 P.2d 76 (Haw. 1968); see also Maunalua Bay, 222 P.3d at 446 
(quoting Ashford, 440 P.2d at 77). 
 180. Cnty of Hawai’i. v. Sotomura, 517 P.2d 57 (Haw. 1973); see also Maunalua Bay, 
222 P.3d at 447 (quoting Sotomura, 517 P.2d at 60).  This rule was later codified in Haw. 
Rev. Stat. § 205A-1 (2001): “[s]horeline” is defined as the “upper reaches of the wash of 
the waves, other than storm and seismic waves, at high tide during the season of the year 
in which the highest wash of the waves occurs, usually evidenced by the edge of 
vegetarian growth, or the upper limit of debris left by the wash of the waves.”  
 181. Sotomura, 517 P.2d at 62-63. 
 182. In re Sanborn, 562 P.2d 771, 774 (Haw. 1977); see also Maunalua Bay, 2009 
Haw. App. LEXIS 807, at *22-24. 
 183. Hawai’i v. Zimring, 566 P.2d 725, 729 (Haw. 1977). 
 184. Id. at 734-35; see also Maunalua Bay, 2009 Haw. App. LEXIS 807, at *32-33.   
 185. Maunalua Bay, 222 P.3d at 451 (quoting Zimring, 566 P.2d at 729).   
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continue to have the same access to the lava extension in question as any 
other members of the public.186   
In summary, under Hawai’i common law: (1) the “highest reach of 
the highest wash of the waves” delineates the boundary between private 
oceanfront property and public property for ownership purposes . . . (2) 
land added to oceanfront property through avulsive lava extension 
belongs to the State; and (3) land added to oceanfront property through 
accretion belongs to the oceanfront property owner.187  
3.  “The Statutory Landscape” 
In 1985, just one year before passage of Maine’s PTILA,188 the 
Hawai’i Legislature enacted Act 221, which prohibited any “structure, 
retaining wall, dredging, grading, or other use which interferes or may 
interfere with the future natural course of the beach, including further 
accretion or erosion.”189 The legislature’s express purpose was to protect 
the public’s access to beaches as well as natural processes of beach 
accretion and erosion.190  Act 221 allowed private claims to property 
rights only in accretions demonstrated to be sufficiently permanent, that 
is, those existing for more than twenty years.191  Then, almost twenty 
years later, in 2003, the Hawai’i State Legislature passed Act 73, which 
provided that owners of oceanfront lands could no longer claim accreted 
lands unless the accretion restored previously eroded land, and that, 
henceforth, accreted lands not otherwise awarded shall be considered 
“[p]ublic lands” or “state land.”192   
                                            
 186. Id.  (quoting Zimring, 566 P.2d at 734-35).  
 187. Maunalua Bay, 222 P.3d. at 453. 
 188. See Public Trust in Intertidal Lands Act, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 §§ 571-573 
(2011). 
 189. 1985 HAW. SESS. LAWS at 401. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Maunalua Bay, 222 P.3d at 458.  The reviewing Senate Committee found that: 
this measure will stop the unlawful taking of public beach land under the guise of 
fulfilling a nonexistent littoral right supposedly belonging to shorefront property 
owners. The measure will help Hawai’i’s public lands and fragile beaches by 
ensuring that coastal property owners do not inappropriately claim newly 
deposited lands makai of their property as their own. 
Id. (quoting S. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 1224, in 2003 Senate Journal, at 1546).  
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4.  Conclusions 
Plaintiffs in Maunalua Bay claimed that Act 73 operated to effect an 
unconstitutional taking of both their present rights in previously accreted 
lands, and their rights to accreted lands in the future.193  The court 
disagreed, however, explaining that no taking could be found with 
regards to future accretions, because the notion of future accretions was 
“purely speculative,” and plaintiffs could thus invoke, at best, merely a 
contingent interest in such non-existent property.194  Furthermore, 
reasoned the court, “Plaintiffs have no vested right to future accretions 
that may never materialize and, therefore, Act 73 did not effectuate a 
taking of future accretions without just compensation.”195  Most 
importantly, perhaps, the court stressed that, because the state 
constitution itself called for all natural resources to be held in trust by the 
State for the benefit of the people, private landowners cannot unduly 
expect that their interests will prevail over public interests in newly 
forming beaches.196   
                                            
 193. Article I, section 20 of the Hawai’i State Constitution states: “Private property 
shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation.”  HAW. CONST. 
art. I, § 20. 
 194. Maunalua Bay, 222 P.3d at 460.  “[A] mere expectancy of future benefit, or a 
contingent interest in property founded on anticipated continuance of existing laws, does 
not constitute a vested right.” 12 C.J. 955.  “Rights are vested, in contradiction to being 
expectant or contingent . . . when the right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has 
become the property of some particular person or persons as a present interest. They are 
expectant, when they depend upon the continued existence of the present condition of 
things until the happening of some future event. They are contingent, when they are only 
to come into existence on an event or condition which may not happen or be performed 
until some other event may prevent their vesting.”  Maunalua Bay, 222 P.3d at 445 
(quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 332 (1880)). 
 195. Maunalua Bay, 222 P.3d at 461. 
 196. It is instructive that article XI, section 1 of the Hawai’i State Constitution, which 
was adopted in 1978, twenty-five years before the passage of Act 73, mandates that 
[f]or the benefit of present and future generations, the State and its political 
subdivisions shall conserve and protect Hawai’i’s natural beauty and all natural 
resources, including land, water, air, minerals and energy sources, and shall 
promote the development and utilization of these resources in a manner consistent 
with their conservation and in furtherance of the self-sufficiency of the State.  All 
public natural resources are held in trust by the State for the benefit of the people. 
Id. (quoting HAW. CONST, art. XI, § 1). 
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D.  Case Study 4: Open Beaches and Rolling Easements on the Gulf 
Coast of Texas  
1.  Factual Background 
When Tropical Storm Frances hit the Texas Gulf Coast in 1998 near 
the Village of Surfside Beach, it marked a significant change in the 
shorefront vegetation line, in the life of Angela Mae Brannan, and in the 
state’s shorefront policy.197   
Since 1959, and through its revision in 1991, the state’s Open 
Beaches Act has provided for the public’s unrestricted access and use 
rights in both the foreshore and the dry beaches.  These easements 
assuring public rights extend from the low water mark up to the 
vegetation line, even as it moves inland due to erosion, storm surge, and 
sea level rise.198  Such an easement has come to be referred to as a 
“rolling easement.”199  The statute further provides for the removal of any 
structure “seaward of the landward boundary of the easement.”200  
Once Frances had shifted the vegetation line, the commissioner of 
the General Land Office duly informed the Attorney General, who 
initially informed the homeowners that their homes would not be subject 
to removal.  However, the Village, also acting pursuant to the statute, 
refused permits for septic and water to be restored to the homes.201  When 
                                            
 197. Brannan v. Texas, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 799 at *4 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010).  
Undoubtedly, Frances impacted many miles of shoreline and scores of homeowners, but 
it had an uncommon, albeit not unprecedented, effect on several residents of Surfside 
Beach.  See id. at *4.  Originally, there were fourteen homeowner complainants, but their 
number was reduced to three when another “force of nature” made most of their claims 
moot.  Id. at *3.  Indeed, even during the pendency of the appeal, another one of the 
houses in question collapsed during a tidal surge.  Id. at *16.   
 198. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE. ANN. § 61.025 (2010); see generally id. § 61.011(a).    
It is declared and affirmed to be the public policy of this state that the public, 
individually and collectively, shall have the free and unrestricted right of ingress 
and egress to and from the state-owned beaches bordering on the seaward shore of 
the Gulf of Mexico, or if the public has acquired a right of use or easement to or 
over an area by prescription, dedication, or has retained a right by virtue of 
continuous right in the public, the public shall have the free and unrestricted right 
of ingress and egress to the larger area extending from the line of mean low tide to 
the line of vegetation bordering on the Gulf of Mexico.   
Id. § 61.011(a). 
 199. See Brannan, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 799, at *36-37 (referring both to a “rolling 
easement” and the “rolling easement doctrine”).   
 200. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE. ANN. § 61.025 (2010). 
 201. Brannan, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 799, at *5.  Indeed, one commentator recently 
argued in these pages for such an approach to shoreline policy, asserting, in accordance 
520 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:2 
 
the homeowners sued both the state and the village for a declaratory 
judgment and damages, the state counterclaimed for an order to remove 
the houses, as they were “seaward of the landward boundary” of the 
easement.202   
2.  On Appeal 
Appealing the resultant judicial order for removal of their homes, the 
homeowners asserted four arguments:  
(1) that the state had not proven the existence of a public beach 
easement,  
(2) that, even if such an easement existed, the houses predated 
the shift of the vegetation line and did not interfere with the 
public’s use,  
(3) that the removal of their houses would amount to a 
permanent taking of their property, and  
(4) that the denial of access to utilities and services was a 
regulatory taking.203 
But these arguments were unavailing.  The court found that the 
statute unambiguously recognized a public easement for access to, and 
use of, the beaches in question, and that the bounds of that easement 
shifted with the vegetation line.204  With regard to the nature of the public 
easement, the court found it to have been established by implied 
dedication, permitting the public to engage in “typical activities such as 
swimming, fishing, sunbathing, playing, relaxing, beach combing, [and] 
surfing.”205 The court further observed that “it is undisputed that under 
the common law and the Open Beaches Act the easement ‘rolls’ or 
moves with the shifting of the line of mean low tide and the line of 
vegetation.”206 
                                                                                                  
with the Texas Supreme Court, that the municipal denial or removal of services does not 
rise to an unconstitutional taking.  See Travis Martay Brennan, Comment, Redefining the 
American Coastline: Can the Government Withdraw Basic Services from the Coast and 
Avoid Takings Claims? 14 OCEAN & COASTAL L. J. 101 (2008) [hereinafter Redefining 
Coastline]. 
 202. Brannan, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 799, at *5. 
 203. Id. at *3. 
 204. Id. at *17, *38. 
 205. Id. at *23, *34.  On the other hand, the days when the beach had served as a public 
roadway were over.  Id. at *35. 
 206. Id. at *62-63. 
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Following other Texas courts, the panel in Brannan explained that 
the ordered removal of a structure under the Open Beaches Act “is not a 
taking because the Act does not create an easement, but provides a 
method of enforcing an easement acquired by other means.”207  It was, 
the court admonished, not an act of government, but an act of nature that 
had moved the vegetation line landward.208 
IV.  SCIENTIFIC OBSERVATIONS AND ENGINEERING DEVELOPMENTS 
A.  Climate Change Impacts 
It is virtually undisputed that our creation of a global greenhouse has 
led to climatological changes that are bound to have an impact on both 
private and public property interests on the coast.  As the director of 
NOAA has unequivocally pronounced: “Climate change is real. It is 
here, and it is happening now, in our backyards and around the globe.”209  
Drawing on findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and 
examining the probable impact of these consequences on the Florida 
economy, one team of scientists recently found that an unequivocal 
global average warming of about 1.0-1.7 degrees Fahrenheit occurred 
between 1906 and 2005.210 
As a result of the temperature increase, according to the IPCC, the 
rate of sea level rise will also increase, which will in turn lead to more 
floods, storm surge flooding, shoreline erosion, and extreme precipitation 
                                            
 207. Id. at *64.  The court distinguished the claims here from those in Nollan on the 
grounds that, unlike here, the California Coastal Commission was trying to establish an 
easement that had not previously existed.   Id. at *66.  Furthermore, the Brannan court 
recalled: “There is a difference between a taking and a limitation upon property use based 
upon ‘background principles’ of state property law.”  Id. at *60 (citing Lucas v. South 
Carolina  Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992)). 
 208. Id. at *67. 
 209. NOAA OFFICE OF COASTAL RES. MGMT, ADAPTING TO CLIMATE CHANGE: A 
PLANNING GUIDE FOR STATE COASTAL MANAGERS iii (2010), available at 
http://coastalmanagement.noaa.gov/climate/adaptation.html [hereinafter OCRM 
PLANNING GUIDE]. 
 210. See TATIANA BORISOVA, NORMAN BREUER & ROY CARRIKER, ECONOMIC IMPACTS 
OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON FLORIDA: ESTIMATES FROM TWO STUDIES 2 (2008) [hereinafter 
CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS]; see also INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007 SYNTHESIS REPORT (Pachauri & Reisinger eds. 2007), available 
at http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/syr/en/contents.html [hereinafter IPCC 
REPORT].   
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events.211  In 1987, even before sea level rise had made it onto the public 
radar screen, the average ocean shore along the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts 
was eroding two and four feet per year, respectively.212  At the extreme, 
erosion rates might meet or exceed the “relentless 6-foot-per-year 
shoreline retreat rate on South Nags Head, North Carolina.”213  Add to 
that a sea level rise of about a foot, and a seven-foot high storm surge 
could be expected to occur at least three times as frequently as today.214  
On the Atlantic seaboard, warming climate could raise sea level by one 
to three feet (or twelve to thirty-six inches) over the next century.  In 
Florida, “even a one-foot increase has the potential to erode 100 to 200 
feet of the state’s beaches, and lead to inundation of the coastal areas.”215   
It goes without saying that none of these consequences bodes well 
for the status quo of seashore communities, but the projections are still 
startling.  For instance, “for every 3.3 feet (one meter) of sea level rise, 
the economic damages from hurricanes double.”216  Florida’s projected 
hurricane damages for 2050 fall between $24 billion and $49 billion, 
with between eighteen and thirty-seven deaths.217  Projected losses from 
four climate change impacts—tourism reduction, hurricane damages, real 
estate losses, and increased costs of electricity generation—may reach 
$345 billion by the end of the twenty-first century.218 
The projections are not much better in Maine.219  A 2008 study warns 
that, while sea level rise is projected at anywhere from ten inches to over 
four feet, “[r]ecent analysis of ice data from Greenland suggests sea level 
rise could occur very quickly.”220  It predicts the same exacerbation of 
                                            
 211. Id. at 2; see also PETE GRANNIS ET AL., NEW YORK STATE SEA LEVEL RISE TASK 
FORCE REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE 19 (2010), available at http://www.dec.ny.gov/ 
docs/administration_pdf/slrtffinalrep.pdf [hereinafter NY TASK FORCE] (“With higher 
baseline sea levels, the effects of storm surge will be felt further inland. Increased storm 
intensity will compound coastal erosion and damage from storm surge. With rising sea 
levels, the expected increase in the frequency, intensity, and inland reach of storm surge 
events will compound coastal damages and erosion.”).   
 212. See MARINE BOARD, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RESPONDING TO CHANGES IN 
SEA LEVEL: ENGINEERING IMPLICATIONS 50 (1987). 
 213. RULES OF THE SEA, supra note 26, at xi. 
 214. Id.  
 215. Id. at 2. 
 216. CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS, supra note 210, at 5. 
 217. Id.  
 218. Id. at 7.  
 219. See, e.g., Charles S. Colgan & Samuel B. Merrill, The Effects of Climate Change 
on Economic Activity in Maine: Coastal York County Case Study  17 MAINE POLICY 
REVIEW 2 (2008), available at http://mcspolicycenter.umaine.edu/?q=colganMerrill_ 
V17N2 [hereinafter CLIMATE CHANGE IN MAINE]. 
 220. Id. 
2011] Drawing Lines in the Sand 523 
 
storm intensity and frequency, as well as storm surges up to twelve feet 
above normal tides.221  In 2006, the Maine Geological Study analyzed the 
probable impacts of sea level rise on two topographically similar beaches 
in close proximity to Moody Beach.222  The resulting report found that 
the “estimated 2 ft rise in sea level will have dramatic impacts along 
Maine’s coastlines in terms of sensitive geographic areas including 
beaches and dunes, wetlands, and nearshore habitats.”223  In an area that 
already sees minor flooding and overwash during storms, predictions 
about the potential effects of a storm that coincided with high tide, on top 
of higher sea levels, were even more grave.224   
B.  Demographics 
While storm surge and sea level rise pose great risks to the seashore, 
it is landward pressures that promise to compound the impacts of these 
seaward threats.  Soon after the Moody Beach Cases were decided, one 
team of coastal geologists remarked that they were less struck by 
increases in the rate of sea level rise and erosion than they were by the 
“dramatic, rapid population increase in the coastal zone” since the 
1950s.225  The narrow fringe comprising 17 percent of the contiguous 
U.S. land area is now home to more than half of the nation’s 
population.226  Between 1980 and 2003, population in coastal counties 
grew by 33 million people, a 28 percent increase.227  As a result of these 
demographic shifts, the nation’s beaches are more crowded than ever, 
hosting approximately 180 million people for two billion visits annually, 
more than twice the number of visits to the country’s national and state 
parks combined.228   
                                            
 221. Id. 
 222. PETER SLOVINSKY & STEPHEN DICKSON, MAINE GEOLOGICAL SURVEY: IMPACTS OF 
FUTURE SEA LEVEL RISE ON THE COASTAL FLOODPLAIN (2006), available at 
http://www.maine.gov/doc/nrimc/mgs/explore/marine/sea-level/contents.htm [hereinafter 
MGS REPORT]. 
 223. Id. at 1.  “Even a 1 ft rise in sea level may have major implications regarding the 
future flooding of private property and public infrastructure.”  Id. at 6.  With a rise in sea 
level of two feet, the report continued, “flooding becomes more pronounced and starts to 
inhibit emergency access to portions of the island.”  Id.  
 224. Id.  
 225. RULES OF THE SEA, supra note 26, at 2. 
 226. NOAA Facts, supra note 1. 
 227. Id. 
 228. JAMES HOUSTON, U.S. ARMY ENGINEER RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CENTER, 
THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF BEACHES—A 2002 UPDATE (2002), available at 
http://www.netlobby.com/pdf/value_of_beaches2.pdf; see also Ocean Facts on Coastal 
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Moreover, whether state courts recognize it or not—and the vast 
majority outside of Maine do—more Americans are going to the shore 
more often to pursue increasingly varied pastimes.229  “Beaches, resorts, 
marinas, harbors and the general lure of the waters bring people to the 
coasts in droves to fish, surf, bathe, sunbathe, sail, build, stroll and live 
their time-honored ‘pursuit of happiness.’”230  Thus, even as coastlines 
are projected to be exposed to increasing risks due to climate change and 
sea level rise, “the effect will be exacerbated by increasing human-
induced pressures on coastal areas.”231  Ultimately, though, as many 
observers have noted, it is these same humans who will have to realize 
the impacts of their behavior and devise successful mitigation and 
restoration strategies.232   
C.  Coastal Engineering 
One such strategy, though its success is at the very least arguable, 
has called for the implementation of so-called “shoreline stabilization 
techniques.”  As with many of our common law doctrines, this strategy 
can also be traced back to the classical Roman era.233  And it is not hard 
to guess why.  The coastal area has long been recognized as “a highly 
dynamic environment,” plagued by flooding and erosion.234   
It was the turn of the nineteenth century, however, that marked the 
great age of coastal engineering in the United States.235  A series of 
devastating hurricanes in the 1890s prompted settlements like Diamond 
                                                                                                  
Tourism, NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., 
http://www.yoto98.noaa.gov/facts/tourism.htm (last visited April 28, 2010).   
 229. See, e.g., Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 
53 (N.J. 1972) (deeming the public trust in the shore “a deeply inherent right” and 
recreational uses to be rightfully ever-evolving); Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 
(Cal. 1971) (deeming the public uses to which tidelands are subject “sufficiently flexible 
to encompass changing public needs”).   
 230. COASTAL STATES ORG., supra note 17, at xii.    
 231. IPCC REPORT, supra note 210, at 26. 
 232. See, e.g., THE H. JOHN HEINZ III CTR. FOR SCI., ECONS. AND THE ENV’T, HUMAN 
LINKS TO COASTAL DISASTERS 12-13 (2002), available at 
http://heinzhome.heinzctrinfo.net/publications/PDF/Full_report_human_links.pdf (“As 
the coasts become increasingly populated, more and more people are placed in harm’s 
way. Thus far, science has not found effective ways to reduce most hazards . . . . In the 
end, it is human decisions on such matters as land use planning and community priorities 
that will build ultimately stronger, safer, and better communities.”). 
 233. RULES OF THE SEA, supra note 26, at 70. 
 234. COASTAL STATES ORG., supra note 17, at 341. 
 235. RULES OF THE SEA, supra note 26, at 66.   
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City, North Carolina, and Edingsville Beach, South Carolina, to give up 
and move.236  But not every community responded quite as malleably. 
When, in 1888, the Brighton Beach Hotel on Coney Island, faced the 
imminent consequences of an eroding shoreline, it was moved back from 
the shore line using steam locomotives.237  And when a 1900 hurricane 
struck Galveston Island, Texas, leaving 6,000 people dead, the city’s 
response was to build an enormous seawall.238  “It was humans against 
the elements, and no one doubted that humans could out-engineer the 
forces of nature.”239  The emerging coastal engineering strategies have 
usually taken one of two approaches, which have come to be known as 
“hard stabilization” and “soft stabilization.” 
1.  Hard Stabilization 
Congress, apparently moved by a similarly tenacious spirit, passed 
the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1889, which charged the U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers (USACE, or the Corps) with the maintenance of navigable 
waterways.240  The Corps, meanwhile, also began building a variety of 
structures meant to counter the effects of shoreline erosion.241  Through 
experimentation all over the American coastline, the USACE developed 
three basic categories of hard stabilization: “1) shore-parallel structures 
on land, such as seawalls [or bulkheads]; 2) shore-parallel structures 
offshore, such as breakwaters; 3) shore-perpendicular structures, such as 
groins and jetties.”242 
But the results of these hard stabilization techniques are actually the 
opposite of those desired.  As it turns out, beaches in front of seawalls 
are consistently narrower than beaches without seawalls.243  The same is 
true of breakwaters, which eventually led the city of Palm Beach, 
Florida, at great expense, to remove its breakwater in 1995.244  Sea 
Bright, New Jersey, stands as another example of just how far awry these 
initial hard stabilization approaches could go.245  In Sea Bright, remains 
                                            
 236. Id.  
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. at 66-67. 
 239. Id. at 66. 
 240. Id. 
 241. RULES OF THE SEA, supra note 26, at 67. 
 242. Id. at 70.  Additional measures to ward off the waves include: revetments, riprap, 
filter cloths, sandbags, and gabions.  Id. at 72. 
 243. Id. at 76. 
 244. See id. at 77. 
 245. Id. at 68. 
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of ancient beach are held in place by long groins but in either direction of 
the groins “virtually no beach remains” in front of the mammoth seawall 
that towers over the thin strip of buildings it was designed to protect.246  
In effect, the beach is “robbed” of its natural and local resupply of sand 
by the seawall.247  What’s more, in 1984, a severe nor’easter caused $82 
million in damages, essentially equal to all property protected.248   Thus, 
although designed with the intent to preserve shorelines, these hard 
stabilization techniques shared one fatal flaw in the final analysis: 
“directly or indirectly they contributed to the loss of the beach that 
fronted the structure. . . .”249   
2.  Soft Stabilization 
Having learned these hard lessons through experience, “coastal 
management practices nationwide generally discourage, and often 
prohibit through regulatory programs, the use of ‘hard’ erosion control 
structures such as seawalls, bulkheads, riprap, groins, and jetties.”250  
Undaunted, though, engineers and planners have turned their attention to 
alternative methods known as soft stabilization.  These include dune 
reconstruction and a technique referred to alternately as beach 
replenishment, renourishment, or restoration.251  “Artificial nourishment” 
has, to a large extent, become “the modern method of maintaining a 
healthy beach to help protect buildings as well as provide a recreational 
resource.”252    
The most obvious benefit of beach “renourishment,” of course, is the 
preservation of an otherwise vanishing place for the public to meet the 
                                            
 246. Id. at 68. 
 247. Id.  As a result, important coastal habitats and public access areas are bound to be 
lost where shoreline barriers, like sea walls and bulkheads prevent wetlands, beaches, and 
other intertidal from migrating inland as sea level rises.  Office of Ocean and Coastal 
Res. Mgmt., Nat’l Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Coastal 
Issues: Climate Change, OCEAN AND COASTAL RESOURCE MGMT., 
http://coastalmanagement.noaa.gov/climate.html#climatefour (last visited Feb. 26, 2011)  
[hereinafter NOAA Coastal Issues]. 
 248. RULES OF THE SEA, supra note 26, at 68.   
 249. Id. 
 250. COASTAL STATES ORG., supra note 17, at 341. 
 251. See RULES OF THE SEA, supra note 26, at 80.   
 252. Id.  “Beach replenishment involves placing new sand, from some outside source, 
on the beach.  Reconstructing the beach is usually carried out by dredging, but sometimes 
dump trucks are used to bring in sand . . . . Sources of sand are the continental shelf, 
inlets and associated tidal deltas, lagoons . . . and inland sand pits.  Beach replenishment 
is the most important, though not the only, form of soft stabilization.”  Id. at 80-81. 
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ocean and recreate—and to keep crucial tourist dollars coming into 
coastal communities.253  In the three decades between 1965 and 1995, 
well over one hundred beaches were replenished on the eastern 
seaboard.254   In one notable example, despite the hesitation of many 
businesses on the strip, Miami Beach was replenished in 1981 to great 
early acclaim, yielding impressive before-and-after photos.255   
Nevertheless, beach renourishment comes with its share of costs, 
which are often hidden in the “storm-protection” and tourism 
preservation pitch to coastal towns.256  First there is the financial cost: $1 
million per mile at a bare minimum.257  Indeed, the Miami Beach 
restoration cost over $5 million per mile.258  But these significant initial 
investments are not the only costs, because replenished beaches only 
have a life span between two and nine years.259  In the second half of the 
twentieth century and the first three years of the twenty-first century, 
even with beach nourishment only just catching on, over $2.4 billion was 
spent on USACE shoreline protection projects, and it is estimated that it 
will require $3 billion to keep New Jersey beaches replenished over the 
next fifty years.260 
As it turns out, in addition to the immediate and recurring financial 
costs involved, there are also identifiable concerns about the impact of 
the dredging, which may either cancel out the effect of the replenishment 
by increasing wave action, or cause turbidity, which can kill off fish and 
coral.261  Recently, the disappearance of sand from one Connecticut 
beach was attributed to “natural causes,” even though dredges had just 
                                            
 253. See Home Page Design and Construction Co., Nat’l Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Ocean Facts on Coastal Tourism, INT’L YEAR OF THE 
OCEAN, http://www.yoto98.noaa.gov/facts/tourism.htm (last visited Apr. 28, 2010) (In 
the United States, “aquatic and beach activities provide 28.3 million jobs and annually 
generate $54 billion in goods and services.”  And more tourists visit Miami Beach 
annually than the Yellowstone, Grand Canyon, and Yosemite National Parks combined).   
 254. RULES OF THE SEA, supra note 26, at 81.   
 255. Id. at 80. 
 256. Id. at 81. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. at 80. 
 259. Id. at 81. 
 260. THEODORE M. HILLYER, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS INST. FOR WATER RES., THE 
CORPS OF ENGINEERS AND SHORE PROTECTION: HISTORY, PROJECTS, COSTS v-vi (2003), 
available at http://www.iwr.usace.army.mil/docs/iwrreports/IWR03_NSMS_1.pdf; see 
also RULES OF THE SEA, supra note 26, at 81. 
 261. See id. at 17. 
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finished mining sand offshore not long before.262  The new beach sand, 
moreover, may be too hard for nesting sea turtles.263   
All in all, while there is no doubt about fast-rising sea levels and 
population levels, there would appear to remain much doubt about the 
efficacy of coastal armoring and soft stabilization.  Taken together, the 
tremendous cost, and ultimate failure, of both hard and soft stabilization 
techniques would seem to point to an obvious moral:  “Society must 
move from engineering against nature to working with nature.”264  
Otherwise, as a result of misguided attempts to prevent any change to the 
shoreline’s profile, the very beaches we are trying to protect could drown 
under the rising sea.265 
D.  Case Study: Plum Island 
For a glimpse of shoreline legal regimes and engineering practices 
that are teetering—along with homes—in the face of oceanic realities, 
one need look no farther than the very state whose pre-colonial ordinance 
and common law tradition of private tideland ownership were heralded 
by the Bell decisions.  In Newburyport, Massachusetts, a number of 
houses on Plum Island have already been lost, and many more, some 
“perched precariously over the sand,” remain threatened by the erosive 
forces of wind, waves, and tide.266  These privately owned houses have 
even been protected by the injection of millions of dollars of public 
money into a beach renourishment program, which, at best, promised 
only to delay eventual property loss by four or five years.267   
Less than two months after the renourishment project was finished, 
at least one-tenth, and perhaps up to one-third, of the newly deposited 
                                            
 262. KAUFMAN & PILKEY, supra note 3, at 40. 
 263. RULES OF THE SEA, supra note 26, at 83.    
 264. Id. at 70. 
 265. NOAA Coastal Issues, supra note 247. 
 266. Mary Jo Shafer, Beach Nourishment Project Gets Under Way, NEWBURYPORT 
CURRENT (Sept. 16, 2010), http://www.wickedlocal.com/newburyport/features/ 
x1129162493/Beach-nourishment-project-to-get-underway.   
 267. Gillian Swart, Beach Nourishment Cost More Than Benefit Says Corps of 
Engineers, EXAMINER.COM (July 20, 2009, 12:20 PM), http://www.examiner.com/north-
boston-political-buzz-in-boston/beach-nourishment-cost-more-than-benefit-says-corps-
of-engineers.  According to the chief of the engineering section for the U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers’ New England region, the cost of just the beach nourishment part of the 
project would amount to $1.8 million and yield a benefit valued at only $1 million insofar 
as it might temporarily delay the inevitable loss of property.  Id.  While the dredging 
portion of the project was funded by the federal government, the cost for the nourishment 
was to be split between the towns and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Id. 
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sand was washed away in a storm.268  In January 2011, another house 
was ordered demolished before it could become a public safety risk to 
beachgoers, and the town began planning for the installation of giant 
sandbags as an emergency protective measure for two other locations.269  
It seems doubtful that any of these measures, taken at great public 
expense, will have even the minimal private benefit sought.   
As it turns out, though, this is far from the first time that residents of 
Plum Island have been abuzz about the shifting sands under their homes.  
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has been surveying the island’s 
protean profile since at least 1827, and it first constructed the jetties at 
the heart of today’s controversy in 1883.270  Plum Island in and of itself 
became a veritable study in the vicious cycles of erosion and accretion 
throughout the twentieth century.271  “Chewed” away by waves and 
currents and buffeted by storms, shorelines vanished by reliction or by 
avulsion, only to reappear on some other portion of the island that had 
been diminished just a decade before.272   
And yet, no matter how predictable the pattern on a large scale, the 
island residents continue to ignore it, bringing more and more resources 
to bear to try and fight the natural cycle.273  Nowhere was this more 
evident than in the 1970s, when, according to one observer, things were 
at least as bad as they are now.274  The majority of the 13,000 sand bags 
filled and stacked in 1972 were swept to sea.275  In 1974, up to $14 
million was spent “trying to hold back Mother Nature.”276  The following 
year, over thirty concrete blocks weighing more than two tons each were 
                                            
 268. Victor Tine, ‘Concern, but not alarm’: Rebuilt Plum Island Beach Showing Wear 
and Tear, THE DAILY NEWS OF NEWBURYPORT (Dec. 5, 2010), 
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 269. See Jim Armstrong, Another Plum Island House Destroyed, CBS BOSTON (Jan. 
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brought in to protect a single cottage, only to be carried away by waves 
that went on to topple the cottage.277   
According to the former mayor, “[i]t was the same situation you 
have today. It’s like deja-vu . . . . It’s never going to cease.”278  In other 
words, “Plum Island, like every sandy shoreline, is a constantly changing 
land mass—eroding in some places, growing in others, always at the 
mercy of tides, current, and weather.”279  
V.  PLOTTING A POSITION, CHARTING A NEW COURSE 
A.  Plotting a Position 
As both a practical matter and a matter of policy, the current position 
of Maine law with regards to the state’s tidelands is untenable.  Some 
common law doctrines are crumbling under the stress of evolving 
technological developments, as well as climatological and demographic 
pressures.  Distinctions between accretion and avulsion grow less and 
less relevant as human intervention in once natural systems grows in 
scale and complexity.  Likewise, the notion of uniting against a common 
enemy becomes increasingly nonsensical when the common enemy is 
ourselves.  Similarly, colonial ordinances once relied upon for economic 
development are now obsolete.  And there is no sign that any of these 
pressures will be letting up soon. 
 Irreversible trends and indicators point to ever-increasing public 
demand for habitation and recreation on the coast.  Irreversible trends 
and indicators, though, also point to an ever-changing, mostly receding, 
coastline.  The next several years will likely bring more frequent and 
intense storms, along with higher tides and storm surges, with both 
erosive and avulsive effect.  Attempts to armor the coast against such 
eventualities have thus far proven counterproductive, and soft 
stabilization techniques have thus far proven cost prohibitive and, at best, 
only temporarily effective.   
As we have seen, though, courts in other states have responded by 
ordering the removal of man-made structures that block navigable waters 
and alter shoreline erosion and accretion patterns.  Whether they do this 
under trespass theory and federal statute, as in Washington, under 
constitutionally recognized public trust theory, as in Florida and Hawai’i, 
or under statutorily recognized, custom-based rolling easements, as in 
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Texas, the judicial panels in these states have consistently honored the 
particular public interest in the shoreline over private claims.  This 
principle was so firmly embedded in Hawai’ian tradition that, even 
today, the fluid concept of make kai and the testimony of kamaainas 
outweigh any surveyor’s azimuths, and the courts recognize that the 
vegetation line reflects the sea’s reach more accurately than any 18.6-
year average.  It is a principle that has been articulated and enforced for 
decades even in notoriously libertarian Texas, perhaps because that 
state’s Gulf Coast communities have had to learn to adapt to the forces of 
the sea more than most.  Florida’s court was accused of taking the 
premise to an extreme, but the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously 
declared that the deprivation of contact with sea or possible future 
accretions did not represent an unconstitutional taking.  At every corner 
of the country, and at every level and branch of government, it is 
recognized that the state can no longer guarantee, to either private 
owners or the public, any more than access to the ever-changing, 
dynamic waterfront.   
Except, still, in Maine.  
The increasing demand and decreasing availability of public beaches 
is a nationwide phenomenon, but it may reach its starkest contrast in 
Maine.  Measuring 3,500 miles, Maine’s coastline is the third longest in 
the country, yet only 7 percent of it is in public ownership, and less than 
2 percent is publicly-owned sandy beach.280  Traditional shoreline access 
points are increasingly built upon, fenced off, posted, or purchased by 
new owners unwilling to allow old patterns of usage.281  Regardless of 
who owns the property, though, “most waterfront homes are within 100 
to 200 feet of the high water mark, and most shores erode 100 to 200 feet 
for every foot of sea level rise.”282  Thus, a one-foot rise would force a 
whole new dilemma onto private landowners and town or state officials, 
for example: the choice between moving the houses at risk, or replacing 
the tidelands with a wall.283   
Sea Bright, New Jersey chose the wall, but the costs of this decision 
have been heavy.  It was, moreover, like the Colonial Ordinance, a 
choice made in a different era.  Today, owners of private tidelands must 
obtain an array of necessary local, state, and federal permits prior to any 
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tideland development, and environmental laws prevent most construction 
activities in tidelands.284 
A careful consideration of the realities of Moody Beach further 
reveals the absurdity of trying to draw legal lines in its sands.285  To the 
extent that they reinforce such irrational use of the beachfront, the Bell 
decisions fly in the face of logic, common sense, and the natural order.  
Intentionally or not, their effect goes beyond a mere delineation of rights 
in a plot of land to reinforce the hubris of landowners and developers 
who insist on tearing up the landscape to erect seawalls and bulkheads 
without adequately contemplating the damage done to a fragile limnal 
habitat, the real risks of installing themselves so close to a rising sea, or 
the long-term private and public costs of maintaining such a precarious 
situation.  In so doing, the Bell decisions rejected an ancient and time-
tested common law doctrine and a contemporary exercise of positive law 
in favor of an irrefutably outdated pre-colonial one.  More importantly, 
they combined bad facts with bad theory to make bad law that would 
bedevil shoreline zones, and especially the rare beaches, up and down the 
coast of Maine for decades.   
                                            
 284. MLI GUIDE 2004, supra note 111, at 8; see also Maine Department of 
Environmental Protection’s (MDEP) Coastal Sand Dune Rules, which take rising sea 
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   285. Author Site Visit, supra note 95.  In front of the beachfront homes, the “swash,” or 
seaweed, line lies just a few feet from the foot of the seawalls, which stand, in turn, just 
feet from the porches and sliding doors of most of the homes on the beach.  Sand piles 
up, apparently placed there by higher tides, at the foot of the seawall, which would more 
rightly be described as a continuous assemblage of fifty-foot sections of privately 
maintained seawalls in various states of renovation or disrepair.  Even to the layman’s 
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Indeed, one section proudly displayed obviously fresh concrete, and a large back hoe was 
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oceanfront homes really are, separated from the visible high tide line by only a few feet.  
It also shows how the supposedly private Moody Beach is seamlessly connected to the 
public beach of the Town of Ogunquit, without any discernible division of any kind.  
Finally, one also cannot help but note the extensive salt marsh wetlands on the inland side 
of Ocean Avenue.  Because wetlands help prevent flooding and shoreline erosion while 
providing critical habitat for a myriad of species, they should rightfully occupy an 
undisturbed buffer zone where the ocean meets flat shoreline. 
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In sum, the current shoreline policy position nationwide, but 
especially in Maine, has grown unsustainable in the face of shifting 
sands, shifting social priorities, new scientific understandings, and rising 
sea levels.  To ignore this reality and quibble about who can do what on 
the wet sand that already disappears for several hours a day, on a beach 
that is likely to disappear in the next century, is akin to rearranging the 
proverbial deck furniture on the Titanic.   
But this state of affairs need not persist.  The Law Court has recently 
heard argument in two cases that both raised questions challenging the 
Moody Beach decisions; it has decided one without addressing the issue, 
but the second decision has not yet come down, and a third case may be 
headed to the Law Court soon.  Interestingly, the PTILA still remains on 
the books, unrepealed by the state’s legislature, and ripe for any needed 
amendment.  Meanwhile, the Maine Geological Survey and the USACE 
are hard at work on a number of studies and projects designed to improve 
information gathering and dissemination about Maine’s shoreline, as 
well as more adaptive responses to sea level rise.   
B.  Charting a New Course 
In addressing where to go from here, property theorists, scientists, 
and policymakers alike seem to be pointing in the same direction.  
Legislatures and courts throughout the country are signaling a principled, 
strategic retreat from the shoreline, leaving the sea and fragile wetlands 
to strike their own tenuous balance with less and less human interference.  
This is demonstrably the case in state and federal courts in Washington, 
Hawai’i, Florida, Texas, and even in the halls of the U.S. Supreme Court.  
It is likewise true in Rhode Island,286 in North Carolina,287 and even in 
                                            
 286. To protect the sediment source of its beaches and preserve natural sand transport, 
the Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Council has all but banned the 
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Massachusetts, where despite pre-colonial predilections, the courts have 
more recently shown little sympathy for ongoing coastal armoring,288 and 
the experiences of Plum Island testify to the futility of shoreline 
stabilization techniques.  Throughout its 2010 coastal management guide, 
the national Office of Coastal Resource Management has emphasized the 
value of learning from others.289  Maine’s lawmakers, in the state house 
and in the judiciary, would do well to heed this call to apply 
comprehensive and consistent policies that recognize the new realities 
crashing upon the shore. 
Even as the Maine legislature and highest court were doing battle 
over the foreshore of Moody Beach, a 1985 conference on “America’s 
Eroding Shoreline” brought together scientists, engineers, attorneys, 
planners, and environmentalists to discuss a national strategy for beach 
preservation.290  A theme gaining increasing currency today could be 
found among the conference findings and recommendations over two 
decades ago:  “Sea level is rising and the American shoreline is 
retreating.  We face economic and environmental realities that leave us 
two choices: 1) plan a strategic retreat now, or 2) undertake a vastly 
expensive program of armoring the coastline and, as required, retreating 
through a series of unpredictable disasters.”291 
In one proposed compromise, engineers and managers at the 
conference suggested combining the gradual removal and relocation of 
buildings, while using an array of damage mitigation options to protect 
beachfront property, including abandonment, relocation, soft 
stabilization, hard stabilization, modifications of developments and 
                                                                                                  
on a barrier island or to maintain an existing commercial navigation channel of regional 
significance. In such cases, the erosion-control structure must not adversely affect 
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 290. RULES OF THE SEA, supra note 26, at 101.  
 291. Id. (summarizing the findings of the Skidaway Conference).  It seems worth 
noting that, at the very moment that Maine’s high court was accusing the state legislature 
of a regulatory taking, coastal planning experts were more concerned about how much 
shoreline was being taken by the sea. 
2011] Drawing Lines in the Sand 535 
 
infrastructures, zoning, and land-use planning tools like setbacks.292  
While the stabilization techniques may offer some comfort, it must be 
remembered that these can only provide temporary protection in the short 
term.  Not far down the road from Moody Beach lies a vivid image at 
Camp Ellis of what lies in store for southern Maine beaches that try in 
vain to armor themselves against the erosive forces of the sea.293  
Moreover, by alienating public interests in the tidelands, private 
landowners are likely to meet with much less sympathy and public 
support when the inevitable call comes for beach renourishment, seawall 
restoration, or, more likely some other adaptation, or relocation aid.  In 
other words, in order to beat a principled, strategic retreat from the rising 
seas, policymakers in all branches of government will also need to beat a 
principled, strategic retreat from the Bell II decision. 
The fact that advocates of the public trust doctrine did not obtain the 
result they sought in Bell II, does not mean the public interest has packed 
up and left the seashore.  By no means did the court foreclose every 
avenue of protecting the public’s own bundle of seaside rights.  For one, 
though it expressed some reluctance to do so, the court did not expressly 
rule out the possibility for a future finding of an easement by custom in 
similar cases.294  More promisingly, although a public easement was not 
found by either prescription or dedication at Moody Beach, ten years 
later, when presented with the opportunity to uphold such a public 
easement just down the road from Moody Beach, the court did exactly 
that.295   
Alternatively, since the Bell court’s objections to the PTILA 
revolved around the lack of limitations on public uses and the lack of 
compensation to private owners, the legislature could very well amend 
the PTILA to include more specific public use restrictions, or some 
minimal Loretto-style compensation for the loss of the right to exclude 
certain members of the public during certain months of the year during 
the few hours each day when the tidal zone is uncovered.  Any number 
of financing mechanisms might be applied fairly and rationally to 
provide for such compensation.   
Although the legislature has not yet attempted such a redrafting of 
the Public Trust in Intertidal Lands Act, it has nevertheless expanded 
                                            
 292. RULES OF THE SEA, supra note 26, at 69. 
 293. See Maine Geological Survey, Aerial Photo of Camp Ellis Beach, Saco, Maine, 
http://www.maine.gov/doc/nrimc/mgs/explore/hazards/erosion/campellis.htm (depicting 
the lots already lost to erosion and inundation since 1908 and the lots facing a similar fate 
as the shoreline advances inland). 
 294. See Bell v. Town of Wells (Bell II), 557 A.2d 168, 179 (Me. 1989). 
 295. See Eaton v. Town of Wells, 760 A.2d 232, 244-47 (Me. 2000).   
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public protections to other aspects of the coastal zone.  And 
administrative agencies have stayed busy making and enforcing rules 
pursuant to these policies.  One commentator has advocated a transfer 
tax, which would add extra tax on the sale of all shorefront properties in 
order to fund the repurchase of public beaches.296  Another has argued, in 
line with the rolling easement approach taken in Texas, for public 
reclamation of coastal lands through incremental withdrawal of utilities 
and services.297  Still others call for the implementation of zoning 
techniques—including incentive zoning, bonus zoning, transferrable 
development rights (TDRs), exactions, and impact fees—to induce 
private owners at the shoreline to convert their property to public 
ownership.298  
James Titus, who has served for years as the EPA’s sea level rise 
expert, has long pushed for coordinated use of all these tools by a variety 
of stakeholders in both the private and public realms.299  But his 
particular emphasis has been on the implementation of rolling easements 
similar to those enshrined in Texas’ Open Beaches Act.300  Rolling 
easements, he explains, can be implemented with eminent domain 
purchases of options, easements, covenants, or defeasible estates, or, as 
in Texas, by statutes that accomplish the same result.301  Titus 
acknowledges that no legislation can eliminate the resentment that arises 
when two groups have long assumed that they possess rights that are in 
fact mutually exclusive.  “But,” he persists, “purchasing or legislatively 
creating rolling easements can minimize the conflict by laying out the 
rules of the game at least a generation before they take effect.  As the 
article argues, people’s ideas of fairness depend mostly on their 
expectations.302  Titus goes on to propose a concerted effort by state, 
local, and private bodies, not unlike the effort which their Maine 
                                            
 296. Thompson, supra note 90, at 71. 
 297. See generally Redefining Coastline, supra note 201. 
 298. COASTAL STATES ORG, supra note 17, at 368-69.  The passage includes a more in-
depth analysis of takings issues and makes the following recommendations for avoiding 
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 299. James G. Titus, Rising Seas, Coastal Erosion, and the Takings Clause: How to 
Save Wetlands and Beaches without Hurting Property Owners, 57 MD. L. REV. 1279 
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 300. Id. 
 301. Id. at 1329.   
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equivalents have all been working on to establish more sustainable 
approaches to our natural frontiers with the rising sea.303 
It is, unfortunately, the one body that Titus leaves out—the courts—
which have thus far clung in Maine to the now irrelevant rationale of a 
300-year-old colonial ordinance, to the great detriment of everyone 
concerned.  So long as the Maine courts maintain such an outdated and 
inflexible policy of private tideland ownership, then both the public and 
the private owners will suffer needless consequences.  But the fact “[t]hat 
generations of trustees have slept on public rights does not foreclose their 
successors from awakening.”304  A quarter century after the Moody 
Beach Cases, it is high time to set aside the missteps and excesses of the 
past on all sides of the issue and find some practical, productive, and 
sustainable policy solutions, and the courts must play a role in this 
process.305   
                                            
 303. Id. at 1391-94. 
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 305. Indeed, the Law Court will have a chance to correct course towards a more 
sustainable shoreline legal regime in one case still pending before it now and another 
probably on its way.  See McGarvey v. Whittredge, WASHSC-CV-08-42 (Me. Super. 
Ct., Wash. Cnty., Jan. 21, 2010); Almeder v. Town of Kennebunkport, No. RE-09-111 
(Me. Super. Ct. York Cnty., filed Oct. 23, 2009).    
